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ABSTRACT
This paper asks the following question: what was the effect of surging immigration on average and
individual wages of U.S.-born workers during the period 1990-2004? We emphasize the need for a
general equilibrium approach to analyze this problem. The impact of immigrants on wages of U.S.-born
workers can be evaluated only by accounting carefully for labor market and capital market interactions
in production. Using such a general equilibrium approach we estimate that immigrants are imperfect
substitutes for U.S.- born workers within the same education-experience-gender group (because they
choose different occupations and have different skills). Moreover, accounting for a reasonable speed
of adjustment of physical capital we show that most of the wage effects of immigration accrue to native
workers within a decade. These two facts imply a positive and significant effect of the 1990-2004
immigration on the average wage of U.S.-born workers overall, both in the short run and in the long
run. This positive effect results from averaging a positive effect on wages of U.S.-born workers with














gperi@ucdavis.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
During the last three and a half decades the United States has experienced a remarkable surge in immigration.
The share of foreign-born workers in the labor force has steadily grown from 5.3% in 1970 to 14.7% in 20051,
progressively accelerating; in the period between 1990 and 2005, almost one million immigrants entered the
country each year. In parallel to this surge, the debate about the economic eﬀe c t so fi m m i g r a n t so nU . S .n a t i v e s ,
and particularly on their wages, has gained momentum both inside academia and in the policy and media arenas.
Two facts have contributed to feeding the debate. On the one hand, the proportion of uneducated workers
(without a high school degree) has become increasingly large among recent immigrants and it is estimated that
an increasing share of these workers is comprised of undocumented immigrants, mainly from Mexico and Central
America2. On the other hand, the real wage of uneducated U.S.-born workers has performed very poorly: it even
declined in real terms during recent decades (see, for example, Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2005). However, when
scrutinizing the poor wage performance of uneducated U.S. workers in the context of labor market competition
from immigrants the recent empirical literature has provided a mixed set of results.
Ten years ago an inﬂuential survey by Friedberg and Hunt (1995) summarized the literature, concluding
that, “the eﬀect of immigration on the labor market outcomes of natives is small.” Since then, a number of
studies have re-examined the issue, reﬁning the estimates by accounting for important problems related to the
endogeneity of immigrant inﬂow and the internal migration of U.S. workers. Even with more accurate and
sophisticated estimates at hand, a consensus has yet to be reached: some economists identiﬁed only small
eﬀects of immigration on wages (Card, 2001) while others found larger negative eﬀects (Borjas, Friedman and
Katz, 1997)3. Recently, the latter view of a signiﬁcant negative impact of immigration on wages, particularly of
uneducated workers, seems to have gained momentum. An inﬂuential article by George Borjas (2003), followed
by Borjas and Katz (2007) and Borjas (2006) who use a similar empirical method, argues using national data
from ﬁve decennial U.S. Censuses (1960-2000) that U.S. workers lost, on average, about 3% of the real value
of their wages due to immigration over the period 1980-2000 and that this loss reached almost 9% for native
workers without a high school degree (Borjas, 2003, Table IX, page 1369), at least in the short run.
Our paper builds on the model presented in Borjas (2003), and takes a fresh look at some critical issues
which imply signiﬁcant revisions of several results. The key idea is that the eﬀects of immigration on wages
c a no n l yb em e a s u r e dw i t h i nageneral equilibrium framework. More speciﬁcally, a study on the eﬀects of
immigration on wages of workers who diﬀer by education, experience, nativity and gender should build on
a production function that describes how these diﬀerent types of workers interact with each other and with
1Authors’ calculations using 1 percent Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) data for the year 1970 and Current
Population Survey March Supplement, Ruggles et al (2006), for the year 2005.
2See for instance Passel (2006).
3We are aware of only one previous paper, Friedberg (2001), that ﬁnds a positive partial eﬀect of immigration on native wages.
In most cases, however, that eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
2physical capital to produce output. Then, one can derive the demand for each type of labor, which depends
on the productivity and employment of the other labor types as well as on physical capital. Finally, market
clearing conditions can be used to obtain wage equations from the labor demands and supplies, and these
can be used to estimate empirically the elasticities of substitution (relative wage elasticities) between workers.
Going back to the production function, these estimates can then be used to assess the eﬀect of immigration
(a change in the supply of diﬀerent types of workers) on wages (the marginal productivity of diﬀerent types
of workers). In contrast, several existing empirical studies directly estimate a reduced-form wage equation for
native workers with certain characteristics (such as educational or occupational groups) obtaining the elasticity
of wages with respect to new immigrants in the same group. Such an approach only provides the “partial” eﬀect
of immigration on wages (as it omits all cross-interactions with other types of workers and with capital) and as
such is uninformative on the overall eﬀect of immigrants on wages.
The general equilibrium approach is accompanied by two novel features of our analysis. First, we remove
the usual assumption that foreign- and U.S.-born workers are perfect substitutes within the same education-
experience-gender group. Whether it is because immigrants tend to choose a diﬀerent set of occupations, because
they are a selected group, or because they have some culture-speciﬁc skills, it seems reasonable to allow them
to be imperfect substitutes for natives even within an education-experience-gender group and to let the data
estimate the corresponding elasticities of substitution. While acknowledging that in principle “[im]migrants may
complement some native factors in production... and overall welfare may rise” (Friedberg and Hunt, 1995, page
23), most studies thus far have focused on the partial eﬀects of immigrants on the wages of those native workers
who are their closest substitutes (i.e., within the same occupation, education-experience or skill groups). By
modeling labor as a diﬀerentiated input in general equilibrium, we enlarge the picture to better capture the
eﬀects of immigration within and between diﬀerent groups.
The second novel feature of our analysis is a more careful consideration of the response of physical capital
to immigration. Since physical capital complements labor it is important to account for its adjustment in the
short and in the long run. In particular, when evaluating the “short run” response of wages to immigration
it seems rather artiﬁcial to maintain a ﬁxed stock of capital, while accumulating immigration ﬂows occurring
over ten or twenty years, as is currently done in the literature. Immigration happens gradually over time (not
at the beginning of the decade) and investors respond continuously, although with sluggishness, to increased
marginal productivity of capital caused by immigration. As for the long run response of capital, any model of
growth (Solow, 1956; Ramsey, 1928), and the empirical evidence as well, implies that capital adjusts in order to
maintain a constant real return (and capital output ratio). For the short run, we use estimates of the speed of
adjustment of capital taken from the growth and the real business cycle literature to evaluate the average wage
impact of immigration. We are also able to assess how long it takes for full adjustment to take place. Rather
3than reporting the eﬀects of fourteen years of immigration for ﬁxed capital and for fully adjusted capital, we
a r ea b l et oe s t i m a t et h ee ﬀect of immigration during the 1990-2004 period as of 2004, and then we show that
within the following 5 years the largest part of “the long run eﬀect” has set in.
Once we account for the aforementioned eﬀects, we signiﬁcantly revise several commonly estimated eﬀects
of immigrants on the wages of U.S. natives. First, in the long run the average wage of U.S.-born workers
experienced a signiﬁcant increase (+1.8%) as a consequence of immigration during the 1990-2004 period. Even
in the short run (as of 2004) the average wage of U.S. native workers increased moderately (+0.7%) because
of immigration. This result stems from the imperfect substitutability between U.S.- and foreign-born workers
so that immigration increases the wages of U.S.-born workers at the expense of a decrease in wages of foreign-
born workers (namely, previous immigrants). Second, the group of least educated U.S.-born workers suﬀers a
smaller wage loss than previously calculated. In the long run native workers only lost 1.1% of their real wage
due to the 1990-2004 immigration. Even in the short run (as of 2004) the negative impact was a moderate
2.2% real wage loss. The methodology used in the previous literature would estimate larger losses, around -8%
in the short run and -4.2% in the long run. The fact that uneducated foreign-born do not fully and directly
substitute for (i.e., compete with) uneducated natives is the reason for this attenuation. Third, all other groups
of U.S.-born workers (with at least a high school degree), accounting for 90% of the U.S.-born labor force in
2004, gained from immigration. Their real wage gains in the long run range between 0.7% and 3.4% while even
in the short run they either gain (high school graduates) or have essentially no wage change (college graduates).
Finally, considering only the relative eﬀect of immigration on real wages of natives, namely its contribution to
the widening of the college graduates-high school dropouts wage gap and of the college graduates-high school
graduates wage gap, we ﬁnd only a small contribution of immigration to the ﬁrst and a negative contribution
(i.e., reduction of the gap) to the second for the 1990-2004 period. The group whose wage was most negatively
aﬀected by immigration is, in our analysis, the group of previous immigrants; however, it is they who probably
receive the largest non-economic beneﬁts from the immigration of spouses, relatives or friends, making them
more willing to sustain those losses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the relevant literature. Section
3 introduces the aggregate production function, derives the demand for each type of labor and identiﬁes the
key parameters for calculating the elasticity of wages to the inﬂow of immigrants. Section 5 presents the data,
illustrates some preliminary evidence of diﬀerences between native and foreign-born workers in the labor market
and produces the key estimates of the relevant elasticities. Using those estimates, Section 6.1 evaluates the
eﬀect of immigration on the wages of U.S. natives for the period 1990-2004. We revisit, in Section 6.2, the
distinction between short and long run analysis and consider the short run eﬀects (as of year 2004) and the
long run eﬀects (during the following ﬁve years and with full capital adjustment) and we compare our results to
4previous ﬁndings on the eﬀects of immigration. Finally, in Section 6.4, we analyze by how much immigration
contributed to the increased wage dispersion during the period 1990-2004. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Review of the Literature
There is a long list of contributions in the literature dealing with the impact of immigrants on the wages of
natives4. Some of these studies explicitly consider the contribution of immigration to increased wage dispersion
and to the poor performance of real wages of the least educated since 1980. Two questions are typically analyzed
by the existing literature. The ﬁr s ti si m b u e dw i t ha“ m a c r o ”ﬂavor: Does the inﬂow of foreign-born workers
have a positive or negative net eﬀect on the average productivity and wages of U.S.-born workers? This question
requires that we aggregate the wages of heterogeneous workers. The second question is more “micro” in focus:
How are the gains and losses from immigration distributed across U.S.-born workers with diﬀerent levels of
education? The consensus emerging from the literature is that the ﬁrst (macro) eﬀect on average U.S. wages
is negligible in the long run, as capital accumulates to restore the pre-migration capital-labor ratio. However,
for ﬁxed capital in the short run there can be a large depressing eﬀect of immigration on wages. Most of the
literature represents immigration as an increase in labor supply for a given capital stock (Borjas, 1995, 2003),
and consequently ﬁnds a negative impact of immigration on average wages (in the short run) and a positive
impact of immigration on the return to capital due to complementarities between the two factors. The recent
debate, however, has focused on the eﬀects of immigration on the relative wages of more and less educated
U.S.-born workers. Some economists argue for a large, adverse impact on less educated workers (Borjas, 1994,
1999, 2003, 2006; Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997), while others favor a smaller, possibly insigniﬁcant, eﬀect
(Butcher and Card, 1991; Card, 1990; Card, 2001; Friedberg 2001; Lewis, 2005; National Research Council,
1997). The size and signiﬁcance of the estimated relative wage eﬀects from immigration remain controversial,
and possibly depend at least in part on the use of local versus national data.
The present article uses a framework from which both the “macro” (average) and the distributional (relative)
eﬀects of immigration can be derived. We argue that only within such a framework, based on the aggregate
production function and general equilibrium outcomes, can one measure and discuss either of these eﬀects. Our
approach builds on the model employed in Section VII of Borjas (2003) and uses national data in performing
estimations. This approach avoids the problems arising from internal migration of natives and from endogenous
location choice and attenuation bias when using metropolitan or state data5.
The modern analysis of the eﬀects of immigrant inﬂows on the wages of natives began with studies that
treated foreign-born as a single homogeneous group of workers (Grossman, 1982; Altonji and Card, 1991),
4This review does not intend to be exhaustive. For a recent and articulate overview of the estimates of the eﬀect of immigration
on wages see Longhi, Nijkamp and Poot (2005).
5See Borjas (2006) and Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) for a discussion of these issues.
5imperfectly substitutable with U.S.-born workers. A number of studies on the relative supply of skills and
relative wages of U.S.-born workers made clear, however, that workers with diﬀerent levels of schooling and
experience are better considered as imperfectly substitutable factors (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Welch, 1979; Card
and Lemieux, 2001). As a consequence, more recent analysis has been carried out partitioning workers among
imperfectly substitutable groups (by education and experience) while assuming perfect substitution of native-
and foreign-born workers within each group (Borjas, 2003). The present article combines the two approaches in
the sense that both can be seen as special cases nested in our more general framework. Speciﬁc a l l y ,w ea s s u m et h e
existence of an aggregate production function that combines workers and physical capital, while using education,
experience, gender and place of origin (U.S. versus elsewhere) to categorize imperfectly substitutable groups.
Following Borjas (2003), we choose a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology but, diﬀerently from
that article, we treat the two groups of U.S.- and foreign-born workers as not perfectly substitutable and we
partition them across eight experience levels and four educational attainment classes. We also allow males and
females to be imperfectly substitutable in order to check whether within education-experience cells the gender
composition of immigrants aﬀected the gender-speciﬁc wage of natives. Within this framework we estimate three
sets of elasticities: (i) between U.S.- and foreign-born workers within education-experience groups, separately for
males and females as well as together; (ii) between experience levels within education groups; and (iii) between
education groups. There is scant literature estimating the ﬁrst set of elasticity parameters. Often, however,
imperfect substitution between natives and immigrants has been cited as the reason for ﬁnding small wage eﬀects
of immigration on natives and larger negative eﬀects on wages of previous immigrants (see Longhi, Nijkamp and
Poot, 2005, page 468-469 for a discussion of this issue). We are only aware of two studies that explicitly estimate
the elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants, namely Jaeger (1996) which only used 1980-1990
metropolitan data and whose estimates may be susceptible to attenuation bias and endogeneity problems related
to the use of local data6, and Cortes (2006) who considers low-skilled workers and uses metropolitan area data
to ﬁnd a rather low elasticity of substitution between U.S.- and foreign-born workers7. The other two sets of
elasticities (between experience and between education groups) have been estimated in several studies (Card
and Lemieux, 2001; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Angrist, 1995; Ciccone and Peri, 2005) and are found to be around
2 (across education groups) and around 4 (across experience groups).
As for physical capital, we explicitly consider its contribution to production and treat its accumulation
as driven by market forces that equalize its real returns in the long run. In particular, we revise the usual
approach that considers capital as ﬁxed in short run simulations. The growth literature (Islam, 1995; Caselli,
et al. 1996) and real business cycle literature (e.g. Romer, 2006, Chapter 4) has estimated, using yearly data
6Jaeger (1996) is also the only previous work we know of that considers male and female workers separately when analyzing the
substitutability between U.S.- and foreign-born.
7A recent paper by Manacorda, et al. (2006) applies a similar framework as this paper to British data and ﬁn d sv a l u e so ft h e
elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants similar to those found in the present paper.
6on capital accumulation and diﬀerent types of shocks, the speed of adjustment of capital to deviations from its
long run growth path. Adopting 10% per year as a reasonable estimate of the speed of adjustment of physical
capital in the U.S. (conﬁrmed by our own estimates for the 1960-2004 period) we analyze the impact of yearly
immigration on average wages as capital adjusts. We can evaluate the eﬀect of immigration that occurred in the
period 1990-2004 on average wages as of 2004, and we can evaluate its eﬀects after ﬁve or ten more years. This
is an important departure from the literature, which has not paid much attention to the response of physical
capital to immigration. When evaluating the wage eﬀects of immigration, the prevalent assumption has been
that of a ﬁxed capital stock in the short run (Borjas, 1995; Borjas, 2003, Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997;
Borjas and Katz, 2007).
Some studies on the eﬀects of immigration on wages have speciﬁcally focussed on immigration (along with
trade) as a proposed explanation for the worsening of income distribution in the U.S. during the years following
1980. In particular, Borjas, Friedman and Katz (1997) found that immigration contributed to the widening
of the wage gap between high school dropouts and high school graduates during the 1980-1995 period but did
not contribute to the widening of the college graduate-high school graduate wage gap. In light of new studies
(notably Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2005, 2006) that further document the evolution of college graduate-high
school graduate and high school graduate-high school dropout wage gaps during the 1990-2005 period, and in
light of our new results that reduce the adverse impact of immigration on wage distribution, we revisit this arm
of the literature by calculating the contribution of immigration to wage dispersion for the 1990-2004 period.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, several studies on the relative wage eﬀects of immigrants have analyzed local
data (e.g., for metropolitan areas) accounting for the internal migration response of U.S. natives (Card, 2001;
Card and Di Nardo, 2000; Lewis, 2005) and correcting for the endogeneity of immigrant location choice (both
factors would cause an attenuation bias in the estimates). These studies ﬁnd a small negative partial eﬀect of
immigrants on wages. On the other hand, our recent work (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005, 2006, 2007) and recent
work by David Card (Card 2007) points out a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of immigration on the average
wage of U.S. natives across U.S. states and metropolitan areas. This positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect survives
2SLS estimation, using instruments that should be exogenous to city-speciﬁc unobservable productivity shocks.
The complementarities in production illustrated in this paper are able to reconcile the negative partial eﬀects
of immigrants on wages estimated in previous studies (such as Borjas 2003) with the positive average eﬀect of
immigration on native wages at the local level8.
8The city model is developed in greater detail in Ottaviano and Peri (2007).
73 Theoretical Framework
In order to evaluate the eﬀects of immigrants on the wages of natives and other foreign-born workers when each
group diﬀers by education, experience and gender we need a model of how the marginal productivity of a given
type of worker changes in response to changes in the supply of other types. At the same time, it is important to
account for the response of physical capital to immigration. A simple and popular way of doing this is to assume
an aggregate production function in which aggregate output (the ﬁnal good) is produced using a combination
of physical capital and diﬀerent types of labor.
3.1 Production Function
Following Borjas (2003) who builds on Card and Lemieux (2001), we choose a nested CES production function, in
which physical capital and diﬀerent types of labor are combined to produce output. Labor types are ﬁrst grouped
according to education and experience characteristics; experience groups are nested within educational groups,
that are in turn nested into a labor composite. U.S.-born and foreign-born workers and, within each of those
groups, men and women are allowed a further degree of imperfect substitutability within the same education and
experience cell. While the nested CES function imposes restrictions on the elasticities of substitution across skill
groups it has the advantage of being parsimonious in parameters and widely used. Moreover, it yields results
easily comparable with a large body of articles in the labor and macro literature. The aggregate production





where Yt is aggregate output , At is total factor productivity (TFP), Kt is physical capital, Lt is a CES
aggregate of diﬀerent types of labor (described below), and α ∈ (0,1) is the income share of labor. All variables,
as indicated by the subscripts, are relative to year t. The production function is a constant returns to scale
(CRS) Cobb-Douglas combination of capital Kt and labor Lt. Such a functional form has been widely used
in the macro-growth literature (recently, for instance, by Jones, 2005 and Caselli and Coleman, 2006) and is
supported by the empirical observation that the share of income going to labor, α, is reasonably constant in the












where Lkt is an aggregate measure of workers with educational level k in year t; θkt are education-speciﬁc
productivity levels (standardized so that
P
k θkt = 1 and any common multiplying factor can be absorbed in the
8TFP term At). As is standard in the labor literature, we group educational achievements into four categories
so that k = 1 denotes high school dropouts (HSD),k = 2 denotes high school graduates (HSG), k =3
college dropouts (COD)a n dk = 4 college graduates (COG). The parameter δ>0 measures the elasticity
of substitution between workers with diﬀerent educational achievements. Within each educational group we
assume that workers with diﬀerent experience levels are also imperfect substitutes. In particular, following the















where j is an index spanning experience intervals of ﬁve years between 0 and 40, so that j = 1 captures workers
with 0 − 4 years of experience, j =2t h o s ew i t h5− 9 years, and so on. The parameter η>0m e a s u r e s
the elasticity of substitution between workers in the same education group but with diﬀerent experience levels
and θkj are experience-education speciﬁc productivity levels (standardized so that
P
j θkj =1f o re a c hk and
assumed invariant over time, as in Borjas, 2003). Since we expect workers within an education group to be
closer substitutes than workers across diﬀerent education groups, our prior (consistent with the ﬁndings of the
literature) is that η>δ . Distinct from most of the existing literature, we deﬁne Lkjt as a CES aggregate of
U.S.-born and foreign-born workers. Denoting the number of workers with education k and experience j who
are, respectively, U.S.-born and foreign-born, by Hkjt and Fkjt, and the elasticity of substitution between them













The terms θHkjt and θFkjt measure the speciﬁc productivity levels of foreign- and U.S.-born workers and they
may vary across groups and years (in the empirical identiﬁcation we impose a systematic structure on their
time variations) . They are standardized so that (θHkjt + θFkjt)=1 . Foreign-born workers are likely to have
diﬀerent abilities pertaining to language, quantitative skills, relational skills and so on. These characteristics,
in turn, are likely to aﬀect their choices of occupation and their abilities in the labor force, therefore foreign-
born workers are diﬀerentiated enough to be imperfect substitutes for U.S.-born workers, even within the same
education and experience group. Diﬀerent productive characteristics between men and women could also imply
imperfect substitutability between genders within the groups of native and foreign-born workers. While the
gender gap literature does not explicitly explore the possibility that men and women are imperfect substitutes
in production, recent studies emphasize the use of diﬀerent skills and diﬀerent task performances between men
and women (Bacolod and Blum, 2006; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2007). Hence in Section 5 below, we test the
degree of substitutability between U.S.-born men and women and foreign-born men and women allowing any
9degree of substitutability between men and women within education-experience-nationality cells. In practice,



















where HMkjt and FMkjt measure male employment and HWkjt and FWkjt measure female employment
among natives and immigrants, respectively, and the terms θHMkjt,θ HWkjt θFMkjt θFWkjt capture their
respective productivity. In the empirical part we test whether the restriction 1/λ =0 ,w h i c hw o u l di m p l y
perfect substitution between men and women, is rejected by the data or not. Ultimately, we allow the empirical
analysis to reveal whether U.S.-born workers and foreign-born workers within the same education and experience
group are perfect substitutes or not and whether their substitutability depends on their gender or only on their
foreign origin.9
As i m p l i ﬁcation adopted here is that the elasticity of substitution between U.S.- and foreign-born, σ, is
taken to be equal across education and experience groups. Such a simpliﬁcation seems empirically sound— in
fact in Ottaviano and Peri (2006) we allowed diﬀerent elasticities between diﬀerent education groups (namely
σk, for k = HSD,HSG,COD,COG) and we could never reject the restriction of identical values across groups
(σk = σ). At the same time such a restriction allows us to estimate much more precisely the parameter σ since
we can pool observations from all education and experience groups.
3.2 Physical Capital Adjustment
Physical capital adjustment to immigration may not be immediate. However, investors respond continuously to
inﬂows of labor and to the consequent increase in the marginal productivity of capital; how fast they respond
is an empirical question. Further, immigration is not an unexpected and instantaneous shock. It seems odd,
therefore, to treat the short run eﬀect as the impact of immigration with a ﬁxed capital stock, which prompts
the question: for how long is capital ﬁxed and why? Immigration is an ongoing phenomenon, distributed
over years, predictable and rather slow. Despite the acceleration in legal and illegal immigration after 1990,
the inﬂow of immigrants measured less than 0.6% of the labor force each year between 1960 and 2004. It is
reasonable, therefore, to think of this issue more dynamically with investments continuously responding to the
ﬂow of immigrant workers. In a dynamic context the relevant parameter in order to evaluate the impact of
immigration on average wages is the speed of adjustment of capital. In the long run, on the balanced growth
path, such as in the Ramsey (1928) or the Solow (1956) models, the variable ln(Kt/Lt) follows a constant
9The standard assumption in the literature has been, so far, to impose that Lkjt = Hkjt + Fkjt, i.e., that once we control for
education and experience, foreign-born and natives of either gender are workers of identical type.
10positive trend growth determined only by total factor productivity (lnAt) and is not aﬀected by the size of Lt.
Therefore the average wage in the economy, which depends on Kt/Lt, does not depend on immigration in the
long run. Shocks to Lt, such as immigration, however, may temporarily aﬀect the value of Kt/Lt,c a u s i n gi t
to be below its long run trend. How much and for how long ln(Kt/Lt) remains below trend as a consequence
of immigration depends on the yearly inﬂow of immigrants and on the yearly rate of adjustment of physical
capital. The theoretical and empirical literature on the speed of convergence of a country’s capital per worker
to its own balanced growth path (Islam, 1995; Caselli et al. 1996), as well as the business cycle literature on
capital adjustment (Romer, 2006), provide estimates for such speed of adjustment that we can use together
with data on total yearly immigration to obtain the eﬀect of immigration over 1990-2004 on average wages in
2004 and in the subsequent 5 to 10 years as capital continues to adjust. We devote the next section, 3.2.1, to
showing in detail the connection between average wages and the capital-labor ratio. In our empirical analysis
we ﬁrst focus on the long run eﬀects of immigration (Section 6.1), allowing for full capital adjustment, as a
natural reference. Then in Section 6.2 we use the estimated speed of capital adjustment to show the eﬀect of
fourteen years of immigration (1990-2004) on wages as of the year 2004, and we compare those results with the
traditional way of computing “short run” eﬀects on wages.
3.2.1 Partial Adjustment, Total Adjustment and Wages
Given the production function in (1) the eﬀect of physical capital Kt on the wages of individual workers operates
through the eﬀect on the marginal productivity of the aggregate Lt.L e t u s c a l l wL
t the compensation to the
composite factor Lt, which is equal to the average wage in the economy10. In a competitive market it equals











Assuming either international capital mobility or capital accumulation along the balanced growth path of
the Ramsey (1928) or Solow (1956) models, the real interest rate r and the aggregate capital-output ratio Kt/Yt
are both constant in the long run and the capital-labor ratio Kt/Lt grows at a constant rate equal to 1
1−α times
the growth rate of technology At. This assertion is also supported in the data, as the real return to capital
and the capital-output ratio in the U.S. did not exhibit any trend in the long run while the capital-labor ratio
grew at a constant rate (Kaldor, 1961). In particular, this is true for our period of consideration 1960-2004. As
depicted in Figure 1 the capital-output ratio (Kt/Yt) shows small deviations around a constant mean over the
44 years considered. Moreover, the de-trended log capital-labor ratio, ln(Kt/Lt), s h o w ni nF i g u r e2e x h i b i t s
10The “average wage” wL
t is obtained by averaging the wages of each group (by education, skill and nativity), weighting them
by the share of the group in total employment.
11remarkably fast mean reversion, as evidenced by the fact that the path of the variable crosses the mean (equal
to 0) eleven times in the sample. This suggests that deviations from the trend do not take more than 4 years,
on average, to be eliminated11. In order to show the eﬀect of diﬀerent patterns of capital adjustment on the
average wage (wL
t ) it is useful to write the capital stock as Kt =κtLt,w h e r eκt is the capital-labor ratio. Hence
wL
t ( f r o me q u a t i o n6 )c a nb ee x p r e s s e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gf o r m :
wL
t = αAt (κt)
1−α (7)
Calculating the marginal productivity of capital and equating it to the interest rate, r augmented by capital


























does not depend on the total supply of workers Lt. Hence, in the short run, the change in labor supply due to
immigration aﬀects average wages only if (and by the amount that) it aﬀects the capital-labor ratio. Assuming
that the technological progress (∆At/At) is exogenous to the immigration process, the percentage change in av-
erage wages due to immigration can be expressed as a function of the percentage response of κt to immigration.












where (∆κt/κt)immigration is the percentage deviation of the capital-labor ratio from k∗
t due to immigration.
With full capital adjustment and the economy in balanced growth path, (∆κt/κt)immigration equals 0. At the
same time, if one assumes ﬁxed total capital, Kt = K, then (∆κt/κt)immigration equals the negative percentage
change of employment due to immigration: −∆Ft
Lt ,w h e r e∆Ft is the increase in foreign-born workers in the
period considered and Lt is the labor aggregate at the beginning of the period. In the extreme case in which
we keep capital unchanged over fourteen years of immigration, 1990-2004, the inﬂow of immigrants, equal to
roughly 11% of the initial labor force, combined with a capital share (1 − α) equal to 0.34, implies a negative
eﬀect on average wages of 3.5 percentage points.
Accounting for the sluggish yearly response of capital and for yearly immigration ﬂows, however, we can
estimate the actual response of the capital-labor ratio to immigration ﬂows in the 1990-2004 period without
the extreme assumption that capital be ﬁxed for 14 years. We do this in Section 6.2 when we revisit the short
run/long run analysis.
11We analyze the capital data and their dynamic behavior empirically in section 6.2.
123.3 Eﬀects of Immigration on Wages
We use the production function (1) to calculate the demand functions and wages for each type of labor at a given
point in time. Choosing output as the numeraire good, in a competitive equilibrium the (natural logarithm of)































To keep notation less cumbersome and because men-women diﬀerences are not the focus of this paper, in the
current section we maintain the aggregate male-female notation within education-experience-nativity groups.
Hence Hkjt (Fkjt) represents the total input of male and female U.S.-born (foreign-born) workers of education
k and experience j and wHkjt (wFkjt ) represents the average wage of the group. In general Hkjt and Fkjt are
the aggregates described by (5). However if men and women of the same education, experience and place of
birth are perfectly substitutable the aggregates Hkjt and Fkjt are simply the sum of male and female U.S.-born
(foreign-born) workers in the group12.W ea s s u m et h a tt h er e l a t i v ee ﬃciency parameters, as well as total factor
productivity At, depend on technological factors and are therefore independent from the supply of foreign-born.
We denote the change in the supply of foreign-born due to immigration between two censuses in group k, j
as ∆Fkjt = Fkjt+10 − Fkjt. We can use the demand function (9) to derive the eﬀect of immigration on native
wages. The overall impact of immigration on natives with education k and experience j c a nb ed e c o m p o s e di n t o
three eﬀects that operate through Lkjt, Lkt and Lt. First, a change in the supply of foreign-born workers with
education k and experience j aﬀects the wage of natives with identical education and experience by changing
each one of the terms Lkjt, Lkt and Lt in expression (9). Second, a change in the supply of foreign-born workers
with education k and experience i 6= j aﬀects the wage of natives with identical education k but diﬀerent
experience j by changing the terms Lkt and Lt. Third, a change in the supply of foreign-born workers with
education m 6= k aﬀects native workers with diﬀerent education k only through a change in Lt. Aggregating
the changes in wages resulting from immigration in each skill group, as well as the response of the capital-labor
ratio κt, yields the wage change due to immigration for each U.S.-born worker13.
Before expressing the formula for the total eﬀect of immigration on the wage of a U.S.-born worker of
education k and experience j,l e tu ss h o wt h ef o r m u l af o rapartial eﬀect of the type emphasized in the large
part of the previous literature. If we only consider the impact of immigrants with education k and experience j
on the wages of natives with identical education and experience, keeping the aggregates Lkt, Lt and κt constant,
we obtain what much of the previous literature calls the “eﬀect of immigrants on wages”. This, in fact, measures
12This, in fact, seems to be the empirically relevant case as we show in section 5.1.
13The exact expression for each of the eﬀects described above is provided in Appendix 1 of Ottaviano and Peri (2006).
13a partial eﬀect, keeping supply in all other skill groups constant and keeping constant the aggregates Lkt and
Lt . Such eﬀects have been estimated in the existing literature by regressing the wage of natives ln(wHkjt)o n
the total number of immigrants in the same group k,j in a panel across groups over census years, controlling for
year-speciﬁce ﬀects (absorbing the variation of Lt) and education-by-year speciﬁce ﬀects (absorbing the variation
of Lkt) (e.g., Borjas 2003). The resulting partial elasticity, expressed as the percentage variation of native wages
(∆wHkjt/wHkjt) in response to the percentage variation of foreign employment in the group (∆Fkjt/Fkjt), is




























i(wFmitFmit+wHmitHmit) is the share of the total wage
bill in year t accounted for by all workers in group k,j.
By construction, the elasticity ε
partial







ln(Lkjt) in (9). According to the standard assumption in the existing literature, U.S.-
and foreign-born workers are perfect substitutes within group k,j (σ = ∞) and share the same eﬃciency (θkjHt =
θkjFt) which implies sFkjt/skjt = κFkjt/κkjt,w h e r eκNkjt denotes the share of total employment represented by




i(Fmit+Hmit).G i v e n
these assumptions, expression (10) simpliﬁes to ε
partial
kjt = −1
η: the harder it is to substitute between workers
with diﬀerent levels of experience (i.e., the lower η), the stronger is the negative im p a c tt h a ti m m i g r a n t sh a v eo n
the wages of natives with similar education and experience. In the general case that we consider (0 <σ<∞),
ε
partial
kjt is still negative but smaller in absolute value than 1
η, the reason being that the negative wage eﬀect of
immigrants on natives is partly attenuated by their imperfect substitutability.
Using estimates of the parameters σ and η,a sw e l la sd a t ao nw a g e sa n de m p l o y m e n t ,t h epartial elasticity
ε
partial
kjt can be easily calculated (see Section 5.3 below). The problem is that this elasticity does not provide any
indication of the total eﬀect of immigration on the wages of natives in group k,j. The reason is that in order to
calculate the total eﬀect we also need to account for the changes in Lkt and Lt produced by immigration, as well
as for the fact that immigration alters the supply of foreign-born workers in all other education and experience
groups and, ﬁnally, for the response of κt to immigration. Once we do so, and aggregate all the eﬀects, the total
























































It is easy to provide intuition for each term in expression (11) by referring to the labor demand equation











is the positive, total eﬀect on the productivity of workers in group
k,j due to the increase in supply of all types of labor; that is, home labor beneﬁts from the increase in
aggregate labor caused by imperfectly substitutable workers. This eﬀect operates through 1
δ ln(Lt)i n( 9 )w h i c h















is the additional negative eﬀect on productivity
generated by the supply of immigrants within the same education group. Since those immigrants are closer
substitutes for natives in group k,j than workers in other education groups, they have an additional depressing




















is the additional negative eﬀect due to the supply of immigrants with







in (9) and it is exactly the partial eﬀect ε
partial
kjt multiplied by the percentage change
∆Fkjt
Fkjt . Finally, the







in (9). Clearly, since the total eﬀect aggregates the partial eﬀect plus 40 other cross-eﬀects (32
in the double summation and 8 in the single summation) and a capital-adjustment term, it will typically be




Fkjt . In fact, when immigration is large in groups with education and experience





tends to be positive, while when immigration is large in the





tends to be negative. In




Fkjt would always be negative for reasonable parameters values.
As they are not perfect substitutes for U.S.-born workers, the impact of immigrants on wages of foreign-
born workers would be somewhat diﬀerent. The percentage change in wages of foreign-born of education k and





























































The ﬁrst four terms of expression (12) are identical to those in (11). Immigration in all other skill groups
(and capital adjustment) has the same eﬀect on the wages of U.S.- and foreign-born workers in group k,j.
15However, immigrants in the k, j group itself have an extra negative impact on the wages of foreign-born in the
same group, represented by the ﬁnal term − 1
σ
∆Fkjt
Fkjt . This term is negative for σ>0 . Immigrants compete in
occupations, sectors and jobs with previous immigrants more than natives and this causes an additional negative
eﬀect on the wage of foreign-born workers. For σ = ∞,t h ee ﬀects of immigration on the wages of workers in
group k,j would be identical, independent of their nativity.
Using the percentage change in wages for each skill group, we can then aggregate and ﬁnd the eﬀect of immi-
gration on several representative wages. The average wage for the whole economy in year t, inclusive of U.S.- and





the average wage of U.S.-born and foreign-born workers can only be expressed as weighted averages of individ-

















respectively (recall that the variables κNkjt represent shares in total employment). The percentage change in
the average wage of native workers as a consequence of changes in each group’s wage due to immigration is






























wHkjt represents the percentage change in the wage of U.S.-born in group k,j due to immigration,





























Finally, by aggregating the total eﬀect of immigration on the wages of all groups, native and foreign, we can


































Recall that the variables sNkjt represent the share in total wages and notice that the correct weighting to
obtain the percentage change on average wages is the share in the wage bill and not the share in employment.
Due to constant returns to scale of the aggregate production function (1), while some of the wage changes are
positive and others negative, when weighted by their wage shares the summation of these changes equals 0
once capital has adjusted fully (i.e., in the long run); hence, the change in the overall average wage in (15) is
approximately 0 in the long run. However, if U.S.- and foreign-born workers are not perfectly substitutable,
16the overall eﬀect on the wage of U.S.-born workers (13) need not be 0 but will be positive instead and the
eﬀect on the average wage of foreign-born workers (14) will be negative. We also adopt the same averaging
procedure (weighting percentage changes by wage shares) in calculating the eﬀect of immigration on speciﬁc
groups of U.S.-born and foreign-born workers. For instance, the changes in average wages of college educated,









j sHCOGjt and the change in average wages of









j sFHSDjt,a n ds oo n .
4 Data Description and Preliminary Evidence
The data we use are from the integrated public use microdata samples (IPUMS) of the U.S. Decennial Census
and of the American Community Survey (Ruggles et al, 2005). In particular, we use the general (1%) sample
for Census 1960, the 1% State Sample, Form 1, for Census 1970, the 5% State sample for the Censuses 1980
and 1990, the 5% Census Sample for year 2000 and the 1/239 American Community Survey (ACS) Sample for
the year 2004. Since those are all weighted samples we use the variable “personal weight” to construct all the
average and aggregate statistics below. We consider people aged 17 to 65 not living in group quarters, who
worked at least one week in the previous year and earned a positive amount in salary income. We convert
the current wages to constant wages (in 2000 U.S. $) using the C.P.I.-based deﬂator across years. We deﬁne
the four schooling groups using the variable that identiﬁes the highest grade attended (called “HIGRADEG”
in IPUMS) for Censuses 1960 to 1980, while we use the categorical variable (called “edu99” in IPUMS) for
Censuses 1990 and 2000 and ACS 2004. Years of experience are eﬀectively years of potential experience. They
are calculated using the variable “age” and assuming that people without a high school degree enter the labor
force at age 17, people with high school degree enter at 19, people with some college enter at 21 and people
with a college degree enter at 23. Finally, yearly wages are based on the variable salary and income wage (called
“INCWAGE” in IPUMS). Weekly wages are obtained by dividing that value by the number of weeks worked14.
T h es t a t u so f“ f o r e i g n - b o r n ”i sg i v e nt ot h o s ew o r k e r swhose place of birth (variable “BPL”) is not within the
USA (or its territories overseas) and did not have U.S. citizenship at birth (variable “CITIZEN”)15. Gender
is indicated as M (male) and W (female). The average wage for workers in a cell, (the variable wNGkjt for
G = {M,W},N= {H,F}, k = {HSD,HSG,COD,COG} and j = {1,2...,8})i sc a l c u l a t e da st h ew e i g h t e d
average of individual wages in the cell using the personal weight (“PERWT”) assigned by the U.S. Census.
The total number of workers in each cell (HMkjt FMkjt,H Wkjt and FWkjt)i sc a l c u l a t e da st h ew e i g h t e ds u m
of workers belonging to that cell. These data also allow us to construct the variables κNkjt and sNkjt,t h e
14For the Census 1960 and Census 1970 only a categorical variable that measures weeks worked exists and is called ”WKSWRK2”.
Individuals are assigned the middle value of the variable in the interval.
15The variable CITIZEN is not available in Census 1960. For that year we consider all people born outside the U.S. as foreign-
born.
17share of each group in the total wage bill and in total employment for each represented year t. These data are
used to estimate the parameters δ, η, σ and λ needed to calculate the eﬀects of immigration on the wage of
each type of worker. When estimating the structural parameters δ, η, σ and λ we always use the whole panel
of data, 1960-2004. When we simulate the eﬀects of immigration on real wages we focus on the most recent
period, 1990-2004. Before proceeding with the econometric analysis, let us present some salient features of the
immigration and wage data as well as some simple statistics suggesting the plausibility of the hypothesis of
imperfect substitutability between U.S.- and foreign-born workers with similar education and experience.
Table A1 in the Appendix reports the share of foreign-born workers in each education-experience group for
each of the years considered, pooling men and women together. In the rows marked as “All Experience Levels”
we report the share of foreign-born for the whole educational group. One fact emerges even from a cursory
look at the table. The distribution of foreign-born across educational groups has been uneven (and increasingly
so) over the period considered. In 2004, almost 35% of the workers with no degree were foreign-born, with
some experience sub-groups counting more than 40% foreign-born. Following this group, college graduates
represent the second highest concentration of foreign-born: almost 15% in the overall group, reaching 18% in
some experience sub-groups. In contrast, the group of college dropouts contained only 9.5% of foreign-born
workers and, in some experience sub-groups, they were less than 8% of the total. Foreign-born were, and
increasingly are, over-represented among the groups of workers with the lowest and highest education levels and
are under-represented among the two intermediate groups.
Table A2 in the Appendix reports the real weekly wages (in 2000 U.S. $) for U.S. native workers in each
education and experience group in each of the years considered. The wages for each group are calculated as
described above. The fact that emerges from Table 2 is the poor performance of real weekly wages of U.S.-
born workers without a high school degree, especially during the last two and a half decades. In contrast, the
performance of real wages of college educated workers has been very strong, particularly during the last two
and a half decades, with the two intermediate schooling groups performing in between.
As y n t h e t i ca n de ﬀective representation of the two facts described above, focussing on the most recent 14
years, is presented in two ﬁgures. Figure 3 illustrates the percentage growth of immigrant employment for each
of the four educational groups. The lightly shaded columns represent immigrants for the 1990-2000 period as
a percentage of 1990 employment in each education group. The darkly shaded columns represent immigration
ﬂows during the 1990-2004 period as a percentage of initial employment. The graph conﬁrms the U-shaped
distribution of immigrants along the educational spectr u m ,w i t ham o r ep r o n o u n c e dU - s h a p ew h e nw ec o n s i d e r
the longer period 1990-2004. Figure 4, on the other hand, shows the growth rate of real wages of native workers
by education group. The lightly shaded columns represent the real percentage change of yearly wages in the
1990-2000 period and the darkly shaded columns represent the 1990-2004 change. One sees very clearly the
18negative performance of real wages for the least educated (almost one percentage point loss in real wage each
year) and the exceptional performance of real wages of college graduates (more than one percentage point gain
each year). The natural questions stemming from these facts are: (i) How much of the negative performance in
the wage of native dropouts is due to the large immigration ﬂow in that group? (ii) How much of the college-high
school dropout wage gap widening is due to immigration? (iii) Given that the average wages of U.S. natives
grew by around 12.5% in the 1990-2004 period, and overall immigration increased employment by almost 12%,
would overall wage growth have been larger without the increase in labor supply due to immigration? We will
address these questions in Section 6.
Before presenting the estimates of the structural parameters of our model, let us put forward some obser-
vations and facts that seem to suggest imperfect substitutability between U.S.- and foreign-born workers in
production. Even considering workers who have identical measurable human capital (education and experience)
and gender, foreign- and U.S.-born workers diﬀer in several respects that are relevant to the labor market. First,
immigrants are a selected group from their original populations and have skills, motivations and tastes that
may set them apart from natives. Second, in manual and intellectual work they have culture-speciﬁc skills (e.g.,
cooking, crafting, opera singing, soccer playing) as well as limits (knowledge of English language or American
culture), creating comparative advantages in some jobs and comparative disadvantages in other jobs16.T h i r d ,
due to comparative advantages, migration networks or historical accidents, foreign-born tend to choose diﬀerent
occupations than natives, even for given education and experience levels. In particular, new immigrants tend
to work disproportionately in those occupations where foreign-born are already over-represented. This should
imply stronger wage competition (substitution) in those jobs compared to other jobs primarily held by natives.
Since services of diﬀerent occupations are imperfectly substitutable, this would imply imperfect substitutability
between natives and foreign-born even in the same education-experience group17.
Diﬀerences in the occupational choices of natives and foreign-born with the same education are illustrated
in Table 1. Following Welch (1990) and Borjas (2003) we calculate the “index of congruence” in the choice
of 180 occupations (from the variable “occupation 1950” homogenized across Census deﬁnitions), between the
group of native workers and the group of foreign-born workers that share the same education group. The index
of congruence is calculated by constructing a vector of shares in each occupation for each group and computing
the centered correlation coeﬃcient between these vectors for the two groups. A value of the index equal to 1
implies an identical distribution of workers among occupations for the two groups, a value equal to -1 implies an
exactly “complementary” distribution. The ﬁrst column in the table reports the U.S.-foreign-born occupational
congruence within each education group. By way of comparison, the remaining columns report the indices of
16Peri and Sparber (2007) develops and tests this story of diﬀerent comparative advantages in production tasks between U.S.-
and foreign-born workers.
17Evidence in support of this fact is presented in Ottaviano and Peri (2006). There we ﬁnd a positive and very signiﬁcant
correlation between the initial share of immigrants in an occupation and the inﬂow of new immigrants in that occupation over the
subsequent decade.
19congruence between natives in diﬀerent education groups. The index of congruence between U.S.- and foreign-
born with identical education is between 0.6 and 0.7, a value comparable to the congruence between native high
school dropouts and native high school graduates (a value of 0.68 reported in the second column of Table 3).
Also (see Welch, 1979), these index values are comparable to the congruence between U.S.-born workers with
diﬀerent experience levels. Hence, given that an extensive literature shows imperfect substitutability between
U.S. workers with diﬀerent education and experience (Welch, 1979; Card and Lemieux, 2001), if part of imperfect
substitutability is due to occupational choice we would also expect it to hold for natives and foreign-born with
similar education.
5 Parameter Estimates
5.1 Estimates of λ and σ
The model developed in Section (3.1) provides us with the framework to estimate the parameters λ and σ.
Calculating the natural logarithm of the ratio of the wages of male and female workers within the same nativity




ln(NMkjt/NWkjt)+ l n ( θNMkjt/θNWkjt)f o rN = H,F (16)
Similarly, the natural logarithm of the ratio of wages of U.S. to foreign-born workers within the same skill







ln(HMkjt/FMkjt)+l n ( θHkjt/θFkjt) (17)







ln(HWkjt/FWkjt)+l n ( θHkjt/θFkjt) (18)
Equation (16) deﬁnes the relative male-female labor demand within each N,k,j group, while equations (17)
and (18) deﬁne the relative labor demand for male and female (respectively) foreign- and U.S.-born workers
in group k,j.T h eﬁrst equation can be used to estimate the coeﬃcient 1
λ which can then be substituted into
(17) and (18), and those can then be used to estimate 1
σ. In each case the estimates are consistent as long
as we identify a source of variation in the relative supply of ln(NMkjt/NWkjt)a n do fl n ( Hkjt/Fkjt)t h a ti s
independent of the variation of relative male-female productivity ln(θNMkjt/θNWkjt) and of the U.S.-foreign-
born productivity levels ln(θHkjt/θFkjt).
20Our estimation strategy proceeds as follows. Due to technological reasons such as skill-biased technical
change, sector-biased technical change, increased international competition, and other reasons over the period
1960-2004, the proﬁles of the returns to education and to experience have changed diﬀerently across occupations.
Accordingly, we allow the relative male-female and U.S.-foreign-born eﬃciencies to have a systematic component
that may vary by education and experience over time. We control for education-year ﬁxed eﬀects (Dkt),
and experience-year ﬁxed eﬀects (Djt). At the same time, diﬀerent education-experience groups may include
male-female and U.S.- and foreign-born workers of systematically heterogeneous quality; hence, we control for
experience-education ﬁxed eﬀects (Dkj). Conditional on these controls, we assume that the residual decennial
changes in relative male-female and U.S.-foreign-born employment within each education-experience cell over
time are due to random supply shocks such as demographic factors in the U.S. and in the immigrants’ home
countries. Using the IPUMS data from 1960 through 2004 we ﬁrst estimate the following regression:




where ukjt is a residual, random, zero-mean disturbance. We estimate the regression separately for U.S.-born
(N = H) and foreign-born (N = F) workers using 192 observations in each case (8 experience by 4 education
groups over 6 years: 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2004) and then pooling U.S.- and foreign-born for a total
of 384 observations. The variables wHMkjt, wFMkjt, wHWkjt, wFWkjt, HMkjt, FMkjt, HWkjt and FWkjt are
constructed as described in Section 4 above. Table 2 reports the estimates of the parameter 1
λ.T h eﬁrst row
is estimated by pooling cells of U.S.- and foreign-born workers, the second is estimated on cells of U.S.-born
workers only and the third on cells of foreign-born workers only. All speciﬁcations use weighted least squares
as the estimation method (weighting each observation by the total employment in the cell). Speciﬁcations in
Column 2 omit year 2004 (not a census year) and speciﬁcations in Column 3 omit year 1960, since immigration
was extremely low before 1960. Robust standard errors are clustered by education-experience groups. Two
results emerge clearly from all speciﬁcations. First, the estimates of 1
λ are always negative and small in absolute
value. Second, they are never statistically signiﬁcant. A test of 1
λ = 0 against 1
λ > 0 never rejects the null
at any conﬁdence level. While the estimates using foreign-born only are quite imprecise, those on U.S. natives
and on all individuals are rather precise. Considering the pooled sample, not only are we unable to rule out
1
λ = 0, but we can reject at a standard conﬁdence level the hypothesis that 1
λ =0 .04 against the alternative
of 1
λ < 0.04. These results imply that even rather small degrees of imperfect substitutability between men and
women are ruled out by the data. Essentially, men and women in the same education-experience-nativity cell
are close-to-perfect substitutes. Hence, using 1
λ = 0, equations (17) and (18) can be simpliﬁed into a single
estimating equation:




where Hkjt = HMkjt+HWkjt and Fkjt = FMkjt+FWkjt and the ﬁxed eﬀects and the error terms are deﬁned
as in (19). Table 3 reports the estimates of the parameter 1
σ obtained using weighted least squares on (20). To
conﬁrm the results of Table 2 and check that gender composition does not aﬀect the elasticity of substitution
between U.S.- and foreign-born workers, σ, we implement regression (20) alternatively on all workers (ﬁrst row
of Table 3) or, separately, on men workers only (second row) and on women workers only (third row). We
also regress relative U.S.-foreign male wages on relative U.S.-foreign female employment (fourth row) or relative
U.S.-foreign female wages on relative U.S.-foreign male employment (ﬁfth row).
The basic speciﬁcations in Column 1 of Table 3 use yearly wages, are estimated using weighted least squares
(weighting each observation by the total employment in the cell) and include observations from years 1960,
1970, 1980, 2000 and 2004. Speciﬁcations in Column 2 use weekly wages. In Column 3 we do not weight the
observations and simply use OLS, in column 4 we omit the observations from 2004 (not a census year) and
in Column 5 we omit the observations from 1960, a year with very few foreign-born workers. The estimates
of 1
σ are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in each estimate. They are quite stable across speciﬁcations and,
except for two cases, they are always between 0.09 and 0.21. The speciﬁcations using weekly wages tend to
produce somewhat smaller estimates (between 0.05 and 0.14), while those using yearly wages give estimates
between 0.13 and 0.21. Interestingly, this implies that a portion of U.S.-born workers’ adjustment in response
to the complementarities of foreign-born workers is reﬂected in an increase in their weeks worked, which is
consistent with higher relative productivity of natives in cells with higher relative supply of immigrants. The
standard errors are generally around 0.04. There are no systematic diﬀerences in the estimates across rows
so that the gender dimension does not seem to play a relevant role in estimating the elasticity of substitution
between natives and foreign-born workers. This is consistent with the previous literature that did not, in
general, ﬁnd diﬀerences in the impact of immigrants across genders, once skill level is controlled for (see the
discussion on page 468 of the meta-study by Longhi, Nijkamp and Poot, 2005). Let us also emphasize that
there is an extremely high correlation across education-experience groups between relative U.S.-foreign- born
employment calculated for both genders, Hkjt/Fkjt, and the relative U.S.-foreign-born employment for males
only (HMkjt/FMkjt) or females only (HWkjt/FWkjt)18. Hence the relative U.S.-foreign-born supply faced by
natives in each education-experience group is similar whether they are men or women.
Table 4 is devoted to performing some further robustness checks in estimating 1
σ. First, by grouping U.S.- and
foreign-born individuals according to their years of working experience, one could be classifying incorrectly the
18The partial R2 of the regression of ln(HMkjt/FMkjt)o nl n ( Hkjt/Fkjt) after controlling for all the dummies is 0.95 and for
ln(HWkjt/FWkjt)o nl n ( Hkjt/Fkjt)i ti s0 . 9 3 .
22eﬀective skills of foreign-born, assigning them to a group that is not their most natural category for comparison.
Employers may value diﬀerently work experience accrued in the U.S. market from that accrued abroad. Hence
we re-classify foreign-born workers by splitting the years of working experience between experience in the U.S.
and experience abroad and then we use the “conversion” factors between foreign and U.S. experience calculated
in Borjas (2003)19. O n c ew eh a v ec a l c u l a t e dt h ee ﬀective experience we group foreign workers in the usual 8
groups (0 to 40 years by 5-years cells) using this new variable. The estimates of 1
σ using foreign-born workers
grouped by eﬀective experience are reported in the ﬁrst row of Table 4. Speciﬁcation 1 through 5 mirror the
corresponding speciﬁcations in Table 3. The estimates range between 0.12 and 0.18 with standard errors around
0.05. Speciﬁcations in the second row of Table 4 consider total weeks worked in each cell (rather than total
employment) as the measure of labor supply. This measure accounts for possible changes in the individual labor
supply decisions. The estimates are still in the 0.14 − 0.20 range and very signiﬁcant. Finally, in the last row
of Table 4 we estimate 1
σ, restricting the data to only the groups of workers with no high school diploma or
with just a high school diploma. These are the groups with the least education and are certainly those with
the largest number of undocumented immigrants. One might be concerned that mismeasurement due to low
coverage of undocumented immigrants could bias our estimates. Alternatively, complementarities between U.S.
and foreign-born workers in these groups could be weaker than within other groups. These issues would result
in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent estimates of 1
σ when we restrict our sample to these groups. The estimates in the third
row of Table 4 are never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those obtained using all workers, and the point-estimates are
slightly above those. This seems to indicate that the Census data do not suﬀer from signiﬁcant mismeasurement
of undocumented workers and that the degree of U.S.-foreign-born complementarity is not very diﬀerent within
diﬀerent education groups.
The estimates of 1
σ as a whole strongly support the idea of imperfect substitutability between U.S.- and
foreign-born workers. Moreover, in general, the estimates imply a value of σ between 5 and 10. Hence, we observe
imperfect substitutability but, reasonably, not to the extent observed between educational groups (usually
credited with a 1.5 − 2.5 elasticity of substitution) and only slightly above that observed between experience
groups for U.S. natives (estimated between 3 and 5)20.
5.2 Estimates of η and δ
We can use equation (20) to infer the systematic component of the eﬃciency terms θHkjt and θFkjt.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
those terms can be obtained using the estimates of the ﬁxed eﬀects b Dkj, b Dkt and b Djt from equation (20) as
19Those factors are based on a wage regression that calculates (pooling 1980-1990 data) the wage growth associated with one
year of work experience abroad, relative to the growth of wages associated with one year of work experience in the U.S. Speciﬁcally,
for immigrants who worked abroad, the years of experience abroad are multiplied by a factor of 0.4 while the years of experience
in the U.S. are multiplied by a factor of 1.6 (Borjas, 2003, page 1356). This implies an “under-accumulation” of useful skills per
year when working abroad and an over-accumulation (catching up) during the years of U.S. work experience.
20See section 5.2 below for those estimates in our paper and in the literature.
23follows:
b θHkjt =
exp( b Dkj)exp(b Dkt)exp(b Djt)
1+e x p (b Dkj)exp(b Dkt)exp(b Djt)
,b θFkjt =
1
1+e x p (b Dkj)exp(b Dkt)exp(b Djt)
(21)
where we have imposed the standardization that the two eﬃciency terms add up to one. Using the values of












. Indeed, the production function (1) and marginal pricing imply the


























where Wkjt = wFkjt(Fkjt/Lkjt)+wHkjt(Hkjt/Lkjt) is the average wage paid to workers in the education-
experience group k, j and can be considered as the compensation to one unit of the composite input Lkjt
21.
Equation (22) provides the basis for estimating the parameter 1
η, which measures the elasticity of relative demand
for workers with identical education and diﬀerent experience levels. Empirical implementation is achieved by
rewriting it as:















δ ln(Lt), time by education






ln(Lkt) and education by experience ﬁxed eﬀects
Dkj capture the terms lnθkj that we assume are constant over time. Once we control for these systematic
shifts in demand our identifying assumption, closely tracking Borjas (2003), is that the remaining variation in
employment of foreign-born workers is due to supply shifts. Under this assumption, we consistently estimate
the coeﬃcient −1
η in regression (23) by 2SLS, using ln(Fkjt), the supply of foreign-born workers in each group,
as an instrument for the variable ln(b Lkjt). Table 5 reports the estimated values of 1
η. The ﬁrst row of Table 5
reports the estimates based on yearly wages, while the second row uses weekly wages. Speciﬁcation 1 and 2 use
the value σ =1 /(0.16) = 6.25 and b θHkjt,b θFkjt estimated from the basic speciﬁcation in the ﬁrst row of column
1o fT a b l e3t oc o n s t r u c tWkjt and b Lkjt. To check whether the gender of workers interacts with the elasticity
of substitution across experience groups, speciﬁcation 1 of Table 5 includes all workers in the calculation of
Wkjt and b Lkjt while speciﬁcation 2 uses male workers only. Finally, in speciﬁcations 3 and 4, in order to check
how sensitive the estimate of η is to imperfect substitutability between U.S.- and foreign-born workers, we also
re-estimate the parameter η assuming σ = ∞ in the construction of b Lkjt. All the estimated values of 1
η are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and between 0.25 and 0.3, with standard errors below 0.10. This implies a point
estimate of η between 3.3 and 4. These values are very similar to those previously estimated in the literature;
21The wage Wkjt is an average of the wages paid to U.S.- and foreign-born workers in group k,j. The averaging weights are
equal to the employment of each group relative to the composite Lkjt, which are very close to their share of the employment of
group k,j.
24the parameter η was ﬁrst estimated in Card and Lemieux (2001). Their preferred estimates of 1/η for the United
States over the period 1970-1995 (as reported in their Table III, columns 1 and 2) are between 0.2 and 0.26,
thus implying a value of η between 4 and 5. Borjas (2003) also produces an estimate of 1/η using immigration
as a supply shifter and assuming perfect substitutability between U.S.- and foreign-born workers. His estimate
is equal to 0.288 (with standard error 0.11), implying a value of η equal to 3.5.
Aggregating one level further, we can construct the CES composite b Lkt. We obtain the estimates b θkj from
the experience by education ﬁxed eﬀects in regression (23), as follows: b θkj =e x p (b Dkj)/
X
j
exp(b Dkj). Then we














function chosen, together with marginal cost pricing, implies that the compensation going to the labor input

























Wkjt is the average wage in education group k22. Following the same strategy that we
used before, we use the above expression as the basis for the estimation of 1
δ. In so doing, we rewrite (24) as
follows:















δ ln(Lt)a n dt h et e r m s( Time
Trend)k are education-speciﬁct i m et r e n d s .T h e s et r e n d sc o n t r o lf o rt h es y s t e m a t i cc o m p o n e n to ft h ee ﬃciency
terms lnθkt that are assumed to follow a time trend speciﬁc to each educational group. Conditional on these
controls, our identifying assumption is that any other change in employment of foreign-born within a group is
a supply shift. Hence, we can estimate equation (25) by 2SLS using ln(Fkt)(w h e r eFkt =
P
j Fkjt is used
as an instrument for ln(Lkt)). Table 6 reports the estimates of 1
δ .T h e ﬁrst row uses yearly wages in the
calculations, while the second uses weekly wages. Speciﬁcations 1 and 2 of Table 6 use the estimated values
of b η and of b θkj from speciﬁcations 1 and 2 of Table 5 to construct b Lkt and Wkt.S p e c i ﬁcations 3 and 4
use η = ∞ and symmetric weights θkj to construct b Lkt and Wkt. Independently of speciﬁcation and workers’
gender, the estimated values are between 0.4 and 0.52 (with standard errors generally below 0.15), consistent
with an elasticity of substitution across education groups around 2. The parameter δ is certainly the most
analyzed in the literature. Its key role in identifying the impact of increased educational attainment (as well
as of skill-biased technological change) on wages made it the object of analysis in Katz and Murphy (1992),
22The weight for the wage of each group equals the size of the composite input for that education-experience cell, Lkjt,r e l a t i v et o
the size of the composite input for the whole education group Lkt. This is very similar to the share of group k,j in the employment
of educational group k.
25through Angrist (1995), Murphy et al. (1998), Krusell et al. (2000) and Ciccone and Peri (2005). The estimates
for the parameter range between 1.4 and 2.5. Our estimates of 1/δ fall between 0.4 and 0.5 and imply a δ in
the vicinity of 2, which is consistent with previous estimates.
5.3 Partial Eﬀects of Immigration on Wages
Before using the estimated values of the parameters λ,δ,η and σ and the formulas derived in Section 3.3 to
calculate the eﬀects of immigration on wages, let us use those estimates to point out an important corollary to
our analysis. Most existing empirical studies on the eﬀect of immigration on wages, (including Borjas, Freeman
and Katz, 1997; Card, 2001; Friedberg, 2001; Section IV—but not Section VII—of Borjas, 2003; and Borjas, 2006)
carefully estimate the partial elasticity of native wages to immigration within the same skill group (expressed in
our equation (10)) and treat it as “the eﬀect of immigration on wages”23. As we illustrated in Section 3.3, this is
simply a partial eﬀect uninformative of the actual overall eﬀect of immigration on wages unless we consider the
whole distribution of immigrant skills, the cross eﬀects among groups and the eﬀect of capital adjustment. More
importantly, the partial elasticity (10) is likely to be negative in any reasonable model as long as immigrants
are closer substitutes to natives in the same group (education-experience) than they are to natives in other
skill groups. Considering men and women within groups as perfectly substitutable and using estimates from






is calculated to be negative and between −0.05 and −0.20. This implies,
for instance, that the percentage change in the wage of native workers in group k,j, ∆wHkjt/wHkjt, would be
between -0.5% and -2.2% in response to an inﬂow of immigrants equal to 11% of the initial employment in
the group24. We use 11% since this equals the inﬂow of immigrants over the 1990-2004 period as a percentage
of total initial employment. If one fails to notice the partial nature of the elasticity used in the calculations
above, one could be tempted to generalize these ﬁndings, interpreting them as saying that immigration caused a
negative 0.5 to 2.2 percent change (1990-2004) in average wages of natives and that groups such as high school
dropouts, for which the inﬂow of immigrants was as high as 20% of initial employment, lost as much as 4.4%
of their wage. No such generalization is possible, however, as expression (10) only accounts for the eﬀect on
wages of immigrants in the same skill group and omits all the cross-group eﬀects from immigrants in other skill







wages of natives across groups have very diﬀerent responses to immigration, some positive and others negative,
due to the relative sizes of skill groups and the relative strength of cross-group eﬀects. Limiting our attention
23Even the recent meta-study by Longhi, Nijcamp and Poot (2005) considers this partial eﬀect as the relevant estimate across
studies. They ﬁnd a representative value of -0.11 that is in our range of -0.05 to -0.20.

















Fkjt is approximately equal to
∆Fkjt
Hkjt+Fkjt if the share of wages of
foreign-born in group k,j is similar to its share of employment in that group. Using
∆Fkjt







we obtain a real wage change of −2.2% < ∆wHkjt/wHkjt < −1.1%.
26to the elasticity ε
partial
kjt , or emphasizing this eﬀect too much would be misleading in evaluating the eﬀect of
immigration on wages.
6 Immigration and Wages: 1990-2004
We are now ready for the third and ﬁn a ls t e pi nc a l c u l a t i n gt h ee ﬀects of immigration on wages of U.S.- and
foreign-born workers. The ﬁrst step of the procedure (Section 3) required specifying a production function and
deriving labor demand curves and the elasticity of wages to immigration of workers with diﬀerent skills. The
second step (Section 5) required estimation of the relevant structural parameters (elasticities of substitution).
The third step (this section) uses these estimates and the actual ﬂow of immigrants by group during the 1990-
2004 period in the formulas previously derived to calculate the eﬀects of immigrants on wages of U.S.- and
foreign-born workers in individual groups as well as overall.
6.1 The Long Run Eﬀects of Immigration on Wages
Table 7 contains the relevant simulation results, relative to the impact of immigration for the 1990-2004 period
on wages of U.S.- and foreign-born workers in the long run. We focus on the 1990-2004 period as it is the most
recent covered by available Census and ACS data and it is the period of largest immigration in recent U.S. history.
To obtain the simulated eﬀects we proceed in ﬁve steps. First, in light of the result of perfect substitutability
between men and women within cells ( 1
λ = 0), we aggregate across genders as follows: Hkjt = HMkjt+ HWkjt
and Fkjt = FMkjt + FWkjt. Second, using formulas (11) and (12), the estimated parameters δ, η and σ as
well as the percentage change in foreign-born workers by skill group (∆Fkj,1990−2004/F kj,1990), we calculate the
percentage change in real wages for U.S.-born and foreign-born workers in each skill group (k,j). Third, we
obtain the average wage change in each education group for foreign- and U.S.-born by weighting the percentage
change of each experience sub-group by its wage share in the education group. This provides the entries in rows
1 to 4 and 6 to 9 in Table 7. Fourth, we average the changes across education groups for U.S.- and foreign-born
separately, again weighting them by their wage shares as described in formulas (13) and (14). Those values are
reported in rows 5 and 10 (those in bold fonts). Finally, we average the changes for the two groups ( U.S.-
and foreign-born workers), still using wage-share weights (as described in formula (15)), to obtain the overall
wage change reported in the last row, number 11, also in bold fonts. Rows 1 to 5 of Table 7 can be compared
to the results obtained in the previous literature that mostly focuses on the eﬀect of immigration on wages of
U.S.-born workers. The lower part of Table 7 reports the eﬀects of immigration on the wages of foreign-born,
rarely considered in the previous literature. The table reports the “long run” eﬀects, namely the wage eﬀects
once capital has fully adjusted, (∆κt/κt)immigration =0 . In Section 6.2 below we focus on the eﬀects as of
27year 2004 and on how long it will take for full adjustment to set in. The four columns of Table 7 are reported
in order to better understand the diﬀerences with the traditional estimates implied by our new ﬁndings of
imperfect substitutability between U.S.- and foreign-born workers. Speciﬁcation 4 calculates the eﬀects under
the traditional assumptions of perfect substitutability between U.S.- and foreign-born workers in each group k,j.
Proceeding leftward, Columns 3, 2 and 1 introduce imperfect substitutability between U.S.- and foreign-born
workers, where column 3 uses the highest estimate of σ =1 0 , Column 2 uses the median estimate σ =6 .6, and
column 1 uses the lowest estimate σ =5 .
Let us begin focussing on the eﬀect of immigration on the wages of natives (upper part of Table 7). The
introduction of our novel feature (imperfect substitutability) has two important eﬀects: ﬁrst, it modiﬁes the
eﬀect of immigration on average wages of natives from null (0.1%) to positive (between 1.2% and 2.3%), and
second, it reduces the adverse distributional eﬀect of immigrants on wages of U.S.-born workers. Both eﬀects
are stronger the lower the substitutability between U.S.- and foreign-born workers. Considering the median
estimate of σ =6 .6, our estimates imply a positive long run eﬀect of immigration on wages of workers with at
least a high school degree. In particular, college graduates beneﬁt from immigration (+0.7% in wages), while
under perfect substitutability they were hurt by it (as shown by the -1.5% in Column 4 ) and high school
graduates beneﬁt up to 3.5% point in their real wage growth. Considering native workers with no high school
degree, their long run real wage loss due to immigration was evaluated by Borjas and Katz (2007), Table 11
at -4.8%25. Column 4 of Table 7 reproduces that negative result obtaining a 4.2% loss in real wages for high
school dropouts when we impose perfect substitutability between U.S.- and foreign-born workers. Our preferred
estimates, however, shown in column 2 of Table 7, report only a small negative eﬀect (-1.1%) on wages of native
dropouts. Overall our results show in the long run a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of immigration on average U.S.
wages, and on each group of workers with at least a high school degree, and only a small negative eﬀect on
wages of workers without a high school degree.
In our preferred speciﬁcation 2 of Table 7, the group whose wages are hurt most by immigration are foreign-
born workers, i.e., previous immigrants. On average they lost 19% of their real wages while some groups (i.e.,
college graduates) lost up to 24% of their wage. Recall that, due to the assumption of constant returns to
scale in the aggregate production function, once capital fully adjusts to immigration the average overall wage
(last row) does not change. Hence, our hypothesis of imperfect substitutability simply shifts the distributional
eﬀects of immigration by increasing the wage competition eﬀect of immigrants on other foreign-born workers
and decreasing it for U.S.-born workers. If the negative eﬀect on wages of foreign-born workers seems large, this
is due to the massive inﬂow of immigrants over 1990-2004 relative to the initial size of foreign-born employment.
Immigrants in the labor force have more than doubled in the period 1990-2004; in particular, foreign-born
25The Borjas and Katz (2007) estimates refer to the eﬀects of immigration between 1980 and 2000.
28workers have increased by 140% (∆F1990−2004/F1990 =1 .4) during that period. Hence, even with a wage
elasticity for that group relative to the U.S.-born group equal to 0.10 (in column 3, σ = 10, hence the relative
wage elasticity 1
σ =0 .1), one obtains a relative wage change of around 14%, split, as we see in column 3, into
an increase of native wages of 1.2% and a decrease in wages of foreign-born of 13.3%. Notice that if σ = ∞
the eﬀects of immigration on wages are identical for U.S.- and foreign-born in the same education-experience
group. The small diﬀerences reported in column 4 between the eﬀects on U.S.- and foreign-born wages are due
to the diﬀerent composition in employment distribution by experience and education between the two groups.
Are the eﬀects of foreign-born workers on wages reasonable? First of all, simply considering the relative
U.S.- to foreign-born wages, reported in table A3, there are some skill groups that experienced large immigrant
inﬂows and a substantial deterioration of their wage relative to natives. For instance, among high school dropouts
between 20 and 24 years of experience, until 1970 wages of U.S.- and foreign-born workers were almost identical,
while in 2004 U.S.-born were earning 12-16% more than foreign-born workers. At the same time, among workers
with no high school degree, those with 0 to 4 years of experience did not experience a large increase in the share
of foreign-born and the relative U.S.- to foreign-born wages in this group did not deteriorate. The worsening of
wages of foreign-born relative to U.S.-born (see for instance Borjas 1999, page 27), which is usually attributed
to worsening in the quality of immigrants, is interpretable in light of our results as an eﬀect of increased wage
competition between foreign-born in those occupations that overwhelmingly employ immigrants. Moreover,
the reason that we do not observe larger native-foreign wage diﬀerentials in all skill groups is probably that
immigrants choose sectors/occupations/jobs with booming demand so that the systematic components of θFkjt
by year and skill (which we controlled for in equation (20)) partly oﬀset the negative eﬀect of increased supply.
Another reason why the eﬃciency term θFkjt may vary, in its systematic part, to oﬀset the increase in supply
of foreign-born, ∆Fkj,1990−2004, has been proposed by Lewis (2005) and Card and Lewis (2007): sectors/jobs
where immigrants’ skills (in terms of education and experience) are more abundant induce technological choices
“biased” towards those skills and use them more eﬀectively, which increases the relative eﬃciency θFkjt. The
negative eﬀects on wages of other foreign-born are, therefore, in part oﬀset by systematic improvements in
relative eﬃciency. Finally, the simulation in Table 7 is done for a given level of employment of native workers.
The actual relative wages observed in Table A3 result from changes in employment of foreign-born as well as
changes in employment of natives. Due to the estimated complementarities, this second change mitigates the
negative wage impact on immigrants.
Finally, let us provide an explanation for an apparent puzzle raised by our results. In light of our analysis,
previous immigrants are the group whose wages suﬀer most due to the arrival of new immigrants. Why, then,
are they consistently among the strongest supporters of more open immigration policies (see e.g., Hatton and
Williamson, 2005 and Mayda, 2006)? Obviously, while they may forego as much as 1% wage growth per
29year due to new immigrants, they are also the group that gains most from a non-economic point of view.
Since immigration (legal and illegal) in the U.S. works mostly through family reunions, network connections
and personal ties, new immigrants are likely to be spouses, siblings, friends and acquaintances of foreign-born
residents in the U.S. and hence are likely to have huge personal, aﬀective and amenity value to them, well above
the negative wage eﬀect that we identiﬁed.
6.2 Reconsidering the Short Run Eﬀects with Yearly Capital Adjustment
How long does it take for physical capital to adjust and restore its long run returns? And in the presence of
sluggish adjustment of capital what are the eﬀects of immigration on wages in the short run? As illustrated in
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change in the wage of each group. Hence the short run wage response for each group and for the averages will
diﬀer from the long run response by a common constant, due to the chosen Cobb-Douglas structure in which κt
only aﬀects marginal productivity of workers through the overall average wage. A popular way to analyze the
deviation of ln(κt) from its balanced growth path trend, used in the growth and business cycle literature, is to
represent its time-dynamics in the following way:










and the term β1 ln(κt−1) captures the sluggishness of yearly adjustment to shocks. The parameter (1 − β1)i s
commonly called “speed of adjustment ” since it is the share of the deviation from the balanced growth path
(trend) eliminated each year. Finally, ∆Ft
Lt are the yearly immigration shocks and εt are other shocks. Assuming
that immigration shocks cause a proportional decrease in κt for the same year (γ = −1), in order to calculate
the eﬀect of immigration on κt over, say, the 1990-2004 period, one needs an estimate of the parameter β1. Once
we know β1 and the sequence of yearly immigration ﬂows, ∆Ft
Lt , one can use (26) to obtain an impulse response
of ln(κt) and its deviation from trend as of 2004 (short run), as well as for later years (long run). The previous
migration literature has essentially assumed β1 = 0 in the short run calculations cumulating the ∆Ft
Lt over one
or two decades for ﬁxed capital (implying a very large deviation from the trend). On the other hand, it has
assumed β1 = 1, (full adjustment) in the long run calculations. The recent empirical growth literature (Islam,
1995; Caselli et al., 1996) and the recent business cycle literature (Romer, 2006, chapter 4), to the contrary,
provide model-based and empirical estimates of β1 . The recent growth literature usually estimates a 10% speed
of convergence of capital to the own balanced growth path for advanced (OECD) economies (Islam, 1995; Caselli
et al., 1996), implying β1 =0 .9. Similarly, the business cycle literature calculates speed of convergence of capital
around 10% (Romer, 2006, Chapter 4) for closed economies and faster for open economies. Hence β1 =0 .9 seems
30a reasonable estimate. We estimated a simple AR(1) process with trend for ln(κt). We constructed the variable
κt =( Kt/Lt), dividing the stock of U.S. capital at constant prices (Net Stock of Private and Government Fixed
Assets from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2006) by the total non-farm employment from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (2006) for each year during the period 1960-2004. We estimated several speciﬁcations including










as shock and instrumented those with
changes in population (to correct for endogeneity of employment)26. All estimates of β1 ranged between 0.8
and 0.9 (speed of adjustment of 10 to 20% a year) with standard errors ranging between 0.02 and 0.08. We
could never reject β1 =0 .9, and we could always reject β1 = 1 (no adjustment). Hence we consider 10%
a reliable and, if anything, conservative estimate of the yearly speed of capital adjustment. Using the series
of immigration rates over 1990-2004 and the estimated parameters of capital adjustment β1 =0 .9,γ = −0.9
(assuming that capital adjustment begins the same year as immigrants are received) the recursive equation (26)
allows us to calculate (∆κ1990−2004/κ1990)immigration as of year 2004 and the share of the deviation from trend
that remains in 2009. Using formula (8) we can calculate the eﬀect of ∆κ on the average wage and on each
group’s wage. Recall that assuming no adjustment of capital in the short run ( β1 =1 ,γ = −1), since the
cumulated inﬂow of immigrants during the 1990-2004 period was 11% of the employment in 1990, this implies
an eﬀect of immigration on average real wages equal to (0.33) ∗ (−11%) = −3.6%, as of 2004. Using the actual
10% speed of adjustment of capital each year, however, we obtain only a −3.4% eﬀect of immigration on the
capital-labor ratio corresponding to a mere −1.1% (= 0.33 ∗ 3.4%) eﬀect on real wages as of 2004, and in ﬁve
more years (2009) the negative eﬀect on wages is reduced to −0.6%. Table 8 uses these adjustments of the
capital-labor ratio and shows the eﬀects of immigration on wages as of year 2004 (column 1) and as of year
2009 (column 2). Those columns use the same parameter values as column 2 of Table 7, i.e., the median and
preferred estimates of σ. We also report in column 3 the long run eﬀects for full capital adjustment (identical
to column 2 of Table 7) and, for comparison, the “short run ” eﬀects calculated assuming ﬁxed capital (as in
the previous literature) in column 4. Finally, the short run eﬀects with ﬁxed capital and perfect substitutability
between U.S.- and foreign-born workers are shown in column 5. Hence column 1 reports the newly calculated
“short run ” eﬀects of immigration while column 5 reports those calculated using the methods prevailing in the
previous literature. The diﬀerences are remarkable. The average wage of U.S.-born workers increased by 0.7%
in our estimates as of 2004, rather than experiencing a decrease of 3.5%. U.S. workers with no degree experience
a loss of 2.2% of their real wage rather than a loss of almost 8%. College educated, U.S.-born workers have
essentially no change in their wage (rather than a 5% loss) and the groups of high school graduates and college
dropouts experience, even in the short run, signiﬁcant gains rather than signiﬁcant losses in their real wages.
26We constructed ∆Ft, for each year from 1960 to 2004, using the following procedure. From the U.S. Department of Justice,
Immigration and Naturalization Service (2004) we obtain the number of (legal) immigrants for each ﬁscal year 1960-2004. We then
distribute the net change of foreign-born workers in each decade (measured from census data and from the American Community
Survey, which includes illegal immigrants as well as legal ones) over each year in proportion to the gross yearly ﬂows of legal
immigrants.
31The beneﬁts of immigration are already realized for most workers in the short run and certainly most beneﬁts
are enjoyed by 2009, with an average wage gain of more than 1% distributed as gains for the three groups with
at least a high school degree and a small loss for high school dropouts. The wage losses, in the short run as well
as in the long run, are concentrated among previous immigrants who experience most of the competition from
new immigrants and undergo sizeable wage losses as a consequence.
6.3 Robustness Checks
Table 9 shows the changes in the calculated long run eﬀects when we use diﬀerent values for the parameters δ
and η in the simulations. While the values used in Table 8, equal to 2 and 4 respectively, seem to be right in the
middle of the estimated range for these parameters (both in our estimates and in previous ones), some scholars
report values of δ as low as 1.5 and as high as 2.5, while the range for η i sb e t w e e n3a n d5 . W er e p r o d u c e
simulations from columns 1-3 of Table 8 using, respectively, the low estimates of δ and η (columns 1-3 in Table
9) and the high estimates of δ and η (columns 4-6 in Table 9). While the average eﬀects on wages of native
and foreign-born workers are not sensitive to changes in those parameters, the distributional eﬀects between
education groups become stronger when we use lower estimates of δ and η . Considering columns 2 and 5 as
references, since they use the median estimate of σ, we see that the wage loss of U.S.-born high school dropouts
can be as large as −2.5%, when δ =1 .5. Still, this number is much smaller than the previous estimates. On the
other hand, if we use the higher elasticity of substitution estimates (δ =2 .5a n dη = 5), unskilled natives barely
suﬀer a loss in wages (−0.3%) from immigration. A similar widening of the distributional eﬀects of wages of
foreign-born workers across education groups takes place using the lower estimates. The widening distributional
eﬀects would also be observed if we lowered δ and η in the simulation with σ = ∞.
6.4 Contribution of Immigration to the Average Wage and Wage Dispersion of
U.S.-Born Workers
The diﬀerences in the real wage eﬀects of immigration on natives shown in Table 8 between speciﬁcation 1 (our
preferred one) and speciﬁcation 5 (representative of previously estimated short run eﬀects) are important. In
order to put them in perspective, it is instructive to compare them with the actual changes in average wages
of U.S.-born workers during the 1990-2004 period and with changes in the measures of their wage dispersion
during the same period. Speciﬁcation 1 in Table 8 implies an eﬀect on average U.S. real wages 4.2% points
larger than the usually estimated short run eﬀects reported in column 5 of Table 10 (+0.7% vs. -3.5%). This is
a large diﬀerence even when compared to the average growth rate of wages of U.S.-born workers in the period,
which equals 12.5%, and is even more notable if compared to the typical changes of real wages over the business
cycle (amounting, on average, to less than 0.5%). Roughly 60% of the diﬀerence between speciﬁcations is due to
32the hypothesis of yearly capital adjustment, while about 40% is due to the imperfect substitutability between
U.S.- and foreign-born workers.
Even more interestingly, since immigration has been connected to increased wage dispersion (e.g., Freeman,
Borjas and Katz 1997 and several others), we can inquire as to the fraction of that increase that could be due
to immigration. There are several ways of measuring wage dispersion across educational groups, depending
on which group we focus on. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 10 provide some standard measures of increased
wage dispersion across educational groups during the period 1990-2004. In particular, Column 2 reports, in
the ﬁrst four rows, the percentage variation in the real wage for each of the four groups relative to the average
real increase in wages27 and, in the last 2 rows, the table shows the real increase in the college/high school
dropout wage premium and in the college/high school wage premium. All numbers are calculated for U.S.-born
workers only. Column 1 reports the actual percentage changes for each real wage group (not net of the average)
showing that high school dropouts actually experienced a real wage loss in the period. Notice, ﬁrst of all,
that wage dispersion increased between any two groups, since lower wage groups (lower education groups) had
lower growth rates of wages. The performance of U.S.-born high school dropouts has been particularly bad,
with wages dropping by 24.4% relative to the average during the period. Also sub-average (but much less so)
were the performances of wages of high school graduates (6.1% lower than average) and college dropouts (4.1%
lower than average). On the other hand, wages of college graduates substantially out-performed the average
(8.9% better). As a consequence, the wage premium (as a ratio) between college graduates and high school
dropouts increased by 33% during the period and the college/high school wage premium increased by 15%.
These statistics are calculated using Census and American Community Survey IPUMS data on wages of all
U.S.-born workers as deﬁned in Section 4. Column 3 shows the percentage changes in real wages attributed to
immigration by our model (speciﬁcation 2 of Table 7) and column 4 shows the share they represent of the actual
1990-2004 change. Looking at the ﬁrst four rows, immigration actually decreased wage dispersion for three
groups (HSG, COD and COG), in that it helped the ﬁrst two groups which performed worse than average, and
hurt the last one that performed better. This is noted in Table 10 by the caption “attenuate dispersion ” under
the corresponding ﬁgures. As for native high school dropouts, immigration contributed to wage dispersion but
it explains less than one eighth (0.12) of the diﬀerence in the performance of this group’s wage with respect to
the average wage. Moreover, immigration does not contribute at all to explaining the increased college/high
school wage premium; if anything, immigration caused a reduction in that premium as the last row of column
4 shows, and immigration only explains one twentieth (0.05) of the increase in the college/high school dropout
premium (second-to-last row of column 4). These numbers seem to show that immigration cannot be considered
27The average increase is calculated by weighting the percentage wage increases of each group by the average wage share of that
group in the 1990-2004 period. It is diﬀerent from the change in the average wage which also includes the eﬀect of changes in
educational shares.
33as an important candidate in explaining increased wage dispersion. Even giving immigration the best shot at
causing wage dispersion by adopting the old assumption of σ = ∞28 (column 5 and 6) one still obtains the
result that immigration attenuated wage dispersion for three groups (helping those which are under-performing,
and hurting those outperforming, the mean) while it only contributed to the under-performance of high school
dropout wages. However, even in this scenario, only one sixth (0.17) of the growth diﬀerential with respect to
the average wage, and less than one tenth (0.087) of the increase in the college/high school dropout premium
can be attributed to immigration.
7 Conclusions
The main message of this paper is that only within a model that speciﬁes the interactions between workers
of diﬀerent skills and between labor and physical capital (in a production function) can we derive marginal
productivity, labor demands and analyze the eﬀects of immigration on the wages of diﬀerent types of work-
ers. The existing literature on immigration has paid much attention to the estimates of the partial eﬀect of
immigrants on wages of U.S.-born workers with similar skills. Those estimates are partial in that they assume
a constant supply of all other groups and of physical capital and therefore are not informative of the actual
overall eﬀects of immigration on wages. In taking the general equilibrium approach instead, one realizes that
the substitutability between U.S.- and foreign-born workers with similar schooling and experience, as well as
the investment response to changes in the supply of skills are important parameters in evaluating the short and
long run eﬀects of immigration on wages. We therefore carefully tackle the tasks of estimating the elasticity
of substitution between U.S.- and foreign-born workers within education-experience and gender cells and we
account for physical capital adjustment in the short and long run. We ﬁnd robust evidence that U.S.- and
foreign-born workers are not perfect substitutes within an education-experience-gender group. This fact, and
the yearly adjustment of capital to immigration, imply that average wages of natives beneﬁt from immigration,
even in the short run. These average gains are, in the short and long run, distributed as a small wage loss to the
group of high school dropouts and wage gains for all the other groups of U.S. natives. The group suﬀering the
biggest loss in wages is the contingent of previous immigrants, who compete with new immigrants for similar
jobs and occupations. Finally, our model implies that it is hard to claim that immigration has been a signiﬁcant
determinant in the deterioration of the wage distribution of U.S.-born workers during the period 1990-2004.
28Assumptions on capital adjustment do not have any impact on relative wages but only on the average wage. Hence the relative
changes in speciﬁcations 3 and 5 of Table 10 could be either for ﬁxed or for fully adjusted capital.
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Natives, HSD  0.65  1    
Natives, HSG  0.68 0.68  1     
Natives, COD  0.61 -0.25 0.22  1   
Natives, COG  0.70  -0.73 -0.91 0.35  1 
 
Note:  The Index of Congruence between the two groups (row and column headers) is 
calculated as the centered correlation coefficient using 180 different occupations and data 
from the 2004 American Community Survey in Ruggles et al.  (2006). The exact definition 









































Note: All Regressions include education-by-experience fixed effects, education-by-year fixed effects and experience-
by-year fixed effects. The reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by education-experience. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of relative male-female weekly wage of workers in the same education-
experience –nativity group, the explanatory variable is the relative labor supply of female to male workers in the same 
education-experience-nativity group.  The first row includes in the regression education-experience cells for U.S.- and 
foreign-born workers. This implies a total of 384 observations for column 1 and 320 for columns 2 and 3. The second 
row only includes cells with US-born workers and the third row only includes cells with foreign-born workers.  This 
implies 192 observations for column 1 and 160 for columns 2 and 3. Observations are weighted by the total employment 




Relative U.S.-Foreign-Born Wage Elasticity within Education-Experience Cells, Overall and by Gender 
 













1/σ (US-Foreign born relative wage elasticity) Overall estimates and by gender groups  
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1/σ (US-Foreign born relative wage elasticity)  Estimates across gender groups 
Relative Wage of U.S./Foreign Born , 
Male Workers and Relative 












Relative Wage of U.S./Foreign Born  
Female Workers and Relative  












Observations 192  192  192  128  128 
 
 
Note: All Regressions include seducation-by-experience fixed effects, education-by-year fixed effects and experience-by-year fixed effects. Errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by education-experience. The dependent variable is natural logarithm of relative wage of US and foreign born 
workers in the same education and experience group, the explanatory variable is the relative employment of US and foreign-born workers in the same 
education experience group. Results in the first row are relative to regressions that use all workers to calculate employment and wages, results in the 
second row use male workers only, and results in the third row use female workers only. The fourth row uses relative wages of male workers and 
relative employment of female workers. The fifth row uses relative wages of female workers and relative employment of male workers. Observations 
are weighted by total employment in the cell, in all specifications except for 3. Specifications 1 to 3 are estimated using observations for 1960, 1970, 
1980, 1990, 2000 and 2004. 













Relative U.S.-Foreign-Born Wage Elasticity within Education-Experience Cells: Robustness Checks 
 
 
Table entries: 1/σ  




































Restricted to the groups of workers with at 












Note: All regressions include education-by-experience fixed effects, education-by-year fixed effects and experience-by-year fixed effects. Errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by education-experience. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of relative wage of US and foreign born 
workers in the same education and experience group, the explanatory variable is the relative labor supply of US and foreign-born workers in the same 
education experience group. In the first row the effective experience for foreign-born workers is calculated by converting years of experience abroad into 
years of US experience. The period considered is 1970-2004, since in 1960 there is no information on the year when immigrants entered the country. In 
the second row we use week-person as measure of labor supply of each group and 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2004 as years. In the third row we 
select only the education-experience groups within the two educational groups HSD (high school dropouts) and HSG (high school graduates) for a total 





Estimates of  η / 1:   Relative Wage Elasticity across Experience Cells 
 
 
Entries are estimates of 
η / 1 
CES Foreign-U.S.- Born Using Estimated σ   Simple Sum Foreign- U.S.-Born 
(imposing σ=∞) 
Specification 1  2  3  4 
Sample  All workers  Male only  All Workers  Male Only 
















Observations   192  160  192  160 
 
Note:  Method of estimation is 2SLS using the log of foreign-born employed in the education-experience group as instrument for the 
variable ln(Lkjt) that is constructed as described in the text. All regressions include education by experience fixed effects and education 
by year fixed effects.  Specifications 2 and 4 use male workers only to calculate the wages and employment. In parenthesis we report the 









Estimates of  δ / 1 : Relative Wage Elasticity Across Education Cells 
 
 
Entries are estimates of 
δ / 1  
CES across Experience Groups,  
estimated η 
Simple Sum Across Experience Groups  
( imposing η=∞) 
Specification  1 2  3 4 
Sample  All workers  Male Only  All workers  Male Only 
















Observations  24 20  24 20 
 
Note:  Method of estimation is 2SLS using the log of foreign-born employed in the education group as instrument for the variable ln(Lkt) 
that is constructed as described in the text. All regressions include 5 time fixed effects and 4 education-specific time trends.  
Specifications 2 and 4 include male individuals only in calculating wages and employment. Specifications 1 and 3 use all individuals in 










Calculated Percentage Changes in Real Wages Due to Immigrant Inflows: 1990-2004.  







Note: Values of the other parameters used in the estimation: δ=2, η=4, α=0.66. The inflow of immigrants in the period 1990-2004 as a percentage of 
initial employment in the group were as follows: High School Dropouts: 20%, High School Graduates: 9.9%, College Dropouts: 6.5%, College 
Graduates: 14.1%, Overall 11.0%. The percentage change for the wage of each worker in group k, j is calculated using the formula (11) for US-born 
and (12) for foreign-born. Then percentage wage changes are averaged across experience groups using the wage-share of the group in 1990 to obtain 
the Table entries. The averages for US- and Foreign-born are obtained averaging the wage change of each education group weighted by its share in 
the wage (as described in formulas 13 and 14). The overall average wage change adds the change of US- and foreign-born weighted for the relative 
wage shares in 1990 (equal to 8.5% for foreign-born and 91.5% for US-born). 
Specification  1  2 3 4 






σ , imposed = ∞ 
% Real Wage Change of Us Born Workers Due to Immigration, 1990-2004 
1) HS dropouts US-born   -0.2%  -1.1%  -2.1%  -4.2% 
2) HS graduates, US-born  +2.9%  +2.4%  +2.0%  +1.0% 
3) CO dropouts, US-born  +3.7%  +3.4  +3.1%  +2.4% 
4) CO graduates, US-born  +1.4%  +0.7%  0.0%  -1.5% 
5) Average, US-born  +2.3%  +1.8% +1.2% +0.1% 
% Real Wage Change of Foreign  Born Workers  Due to Immigration, 1990-2004 
6) HS dropouts Foreign-born   -20.2%  -16.3%  -12.3%  -4.4% 
7) HS graduates, Foreign-born  -31.7%  -23.5%  -15%  +1.0% 
8) CO dropouts, Foreign-born  -17.4%  -12.3%  -7.3%  +2.4% 
9) CO graduates, Foreign-born  -31.6%  -24.2%  -16%  -1.6% 
10) Average Foreign-born  -26.3% -19.8%  -13.3% -0.9% 
11) Overall Average:  
Native and US-Born 






Calculated Percentage Changes in Real Wages Due to Immigrant Inflows: 1990-2004. 
Short Run Effects, Accounting for Yearly Capital Adjustment.  
 
Note: Values of the other parameters used in the estimation of columns 1, 2, 3 and 4: σ=6.6, δ=2, η=4, α=0.66. Column 5 assumes : σ=∞, 
δ=2, η=4, α=0.66.   The inflow of immigrants in the period 1990-2004 as a percentage of initial employment in the group were as follows: 
High School Dropouts: 20%, High School Graduates: 9.9%, College Dropouts: 6.5%, College Graduates: 14.1%, Overall 11.0%. The formulas 
used to obtain single entries and averages are identical to those used in Table 9.  The method used to construct the percentage changes in wages 
is identical to the one used in Table 9. The change in the capital-labor ratio due to immigration as of 2004 and 2009 is calculated using yearly 
immigration flows and the recursive formula (26) in the text. The effect of immigration 1990-2004 on the capital-labor ratio as of 2004 
(column 1) is -3.4% and it is -2.0% as of 2009 (column 2). To the contrary, the effect assuming fixed capital (column 4 and 5) is -11%.  
 
Specification 1  2  3  4  5 
Estimates of σ  As of 2004 
(short run) 




Fixed K and  
σ , imposed = ∞ 
 
% Real Wage Change of US-Born Workers Due to Immigration, 1990-2004 
HS dropouts US-born   -2.2%  -1.7%  -1.1%  -4.8%  -7.9% 
HS graduates, US-born  +1.3%  +1.8%  +2.4%  -1.2%  -2.6% 
CO dropouts, US-born  +2.3%  +2.8%  +3.4  -0.2%  -1.2% 
CO graduates, US-born  -0.4%  +0.1%  +0.7%  -2.9%  -5.2% 
Average, US-Born  +0.7%  +1.2% +1.8%  -1.9% -3.5% 
% Real Wage Change of Foreign  Born Workers  Due to Immigration, 1990-2004 
HS dropouts Foreign-born   -17.4% -16.9% -16.3%  -19.9%  -8.1% 
HS graduates, Foreign-born  -24.6%  -24.1%  -23.5%  -27.1%  -2.6% 
CO dropouts, Foreign-born  -13.4%  -12.9%  -12.3%  -15.9%  -1.2% 
CO graduates, Foreign-born  -25.3%  -24.8%  -24.2%  -27.8%  -5.3% 
Average Foreign-born  -20.9%  -20.4% -19.8%  -23.4% -4.7% 
Overall Average:  
Native and US-Born 





Calculated Percentage Changes in Real Wages Due to Immigrant Inflows: 1990-2004.  




Note: Inflow of immigrants in the period 1990-2004 as a percentage of initial employment in the group: High School Dropouts: 20%, 
High School Graduates: 9.9%, College Dropouts: 6.5%, College Graduates: 14.1%, Overall 11.0%. The formulas used to obtain single 
entries and averages are identical to those used in Table 9.  The method used to construct the percentage changes in wages is identical 




Value of δ  1.5 2.5 
Value of η  3 5 
Specification 1  2  3  4  5  6 












% Real Wage Change of US-Born Workers Due to Immigration, 1990-2004 
HS dropouts US-born   -1.6%  -2.5%  -3.5%  +0.6%  -0.3%  -1.3% 
HS graduates, US-born  +3.3%  +2.8% +2.3%  +2.7% +2.2%  +1.8% 
CO dropouts, US-born  +4.6%  +4.2%  +3.9%  +3.2%  +2.9%  +2.6% 
CO graduates, US-born  0.9%  +0.2%  -0.6%  +1.7%  +1.0%  -0.2% 
Average, US-Born  +2.3%  +1.8% +1.2%  +2.3%  +1.8%  +1.2% 
% Real Wage Change of Foreign -Born Workers  Due to Immigration, 1990-2004 
HS dropouts Foreign-born   -21.0%  -17.8% -14.0%  -19.3%  -15.3%  -11.4% 
HS graduates, Foreign-born  -31.2%  -23.3% -15.0%  -31.5%  -23.4%  -15.3% 
CO dropouts, Foreign-born  -16.1%  -11.2%  -6.4%  -17.5%  -12.7%  -7.8% 
CO graduates, Foreign-born  -32%  -24.8% -17%  31.1%  -23.8%  -16% 
Average Foreign-born  -26% -19.6% -13.6%  -26%  -19.6%  -13.6% 
Overall  Average: 
Native and Foreign-Born 
0% 0%  0%  0%  0%  0%   48
 
Table 10 
Effect of Immigrants on Real Wage Dispersion of US Natives, 1990-2004 
 
Note:   The wages for each group are calculated considering all US-born workers between the ages of 17 and 65, from the IPUMS Census 1990 and 
the IPUMS American Community Survey 2004 as described in the main text. The CPI deflator is used to convert the wages to constant 2000 $. The 
average growth of real wages between 1990 and 2004 was 12.5%. It is calculated weighting the percentage increases in real wages of each education 
group by their average wage shares in the period 1990-2004. 
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Figure 3 
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Appendix 
Table A1: 











































Note: Individuals included in calculations are those between 17 and 65 years, not living in group quarters who received 
non-zero income and worked at least one week during the previous year. Foreign-born are workers born outside of the  
US who are not citizens at birth. Sources: Authors’ calculations on individual data from Census IPUMS and ACS from 




Education  Experience  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2004 
0  to  4  0.039 0.036 0.058 0.101 0.119 0.116 
5  to  9  0.061 0.060 0.138 0.264 0.375 0.354 
10  to  14  0.058 0.066 0.166 0.252 0.426 0.472 
15  to  19  0.056 0.072 0.143 0.262 0.416 0.493 
20  to  24  0.058 0.070 0.132 0.270 0.364 0.442 
25  to  29  0.055 0.061 0.124 0.222 0.363 0.377 
30  to  34  0.083 0.061 0.101 0.179 0.358 0.382 
High School 
Dropouts 
34  to  40  0.122 0.058 0.086 0.161 0.281 0.345 
  All Experience 
Levels  0.07  0.060 0.109 0.205 0.306 0.341 
0  to  4  0.019 0.025 0.032 0.057 0.095 0.107 
5  to  9  0.025 0.028 0.038 0.062 0.125 0.148 
10  to  14  0.028 0.033 0.046 0.057 0.118 0.167 
15  to  19  0.036 0.035 0.047 0.057 0.100 0.157 
20  to  24  0.035 0.037 0.051 0.062 0.085 0.119 
25  to  29  0.046 0.041 0.050 0.059 0.082 0.105 
30  to  34  0.065 0.040 0.051 0.060 0.081 0.097 
High School 
Graduates 
34  to  40  0.108 0.049 0.054 0.055 0.072 0.097 
  All Experience 
Levels  0.038 0.034 0.044 0.059 0.095 0.124 
0  to  4  0.030 0.031 0.046 0.062 0.084 0.081 
5  to  9  0.042 0.047 0.051 0.071 0.097 0.104 
10  to  14  0.048 0.054 0.058 0.066 0.103 0.110 
15  to  19  0.055 0.058 0.065 0.063 0.095 0.117 
20  to  24  0.048 0.054 0.070 0.065 0.084 0.101 
25  to  29  0.052 0.058 0.065 0.070 0.076 0.087 
30  to  34  0.076 0.046 0.067 0.074 0.074 0.077 
College 
Dropouts 
34  to  40  0.099 0.057 0.067 0.072 0.077 0.076 
  All Experience 
Levels  0.052 0.048 0.057 0.067 0.088 0.095 
0 to 4  0.035 0.035 0.042 0.070 0.121 0.114 
5 to 9  0.045 0.064 0.062 0.090 0.143 0.173 
10 to 14  0.053 0.069 0.080 0.094 0.153 0.178 
15 to 19  0.056 0.060 0.097 0.087 0.138 0.160 
20 to 24  0.052 0.053 0.088 0.093 0.120 0.149 
25 to 29  0.064 0.058 0.073 0.107 0.105 0.126 
30 to 34  0.071 0.056 0.072 0.095 0.105 0.104 




Levels  0.054 0.056 0.070 0.089 0.128 0.146   52
Table A2: 
Weekly Wages of U.S. Natives in Constant 2000 U.S. $ by Education and Experience 
 
Group Year 
Education  Experience  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2004 
0  to  4  207 246 207 180 214 179 
5  to  9  324 384 370 358 406 357 
10  to  14  377 442 415 423 480 446 
15  to  19  403 452 444 455 507 489 
20  to  24  401 468 471 476 554 548 
25  to  29  403 486 482 500 579 549 
30  to  34  399 470 494 522 594 599 
High School 
Dropouts 
34  to  40  402 463 500 521 608 585 
  All Experience 
Levels  374 431 495 402 424 400 
0  to  4  307 355 334 313 350 325 
5  to  9  404 476 439 437 485 457 
10  to  14  454 526 487 504 553 567 
15  to  19  472 538 526 537 606 631 
20  to  24  484 546 544 559 642 645 
25  to  29  486 551 552 596 658 658 
30  to  34  485 565 560 606 665 681 
High School 
Graduates 
34  to  40  476 556 558 587 681 673 
  All Experience 
Levels  463 501 478 507 579 576 
0  to  4  354 402 365 359 388 374 
5  to  9  473 565 495 522 571 570 
10  to  14  543 639 573 604 665 686 
15  to  19  574 672 631 656 731 755 
20  to  24  583 694 649 708 775 794 
25  to  29  573 706 660 749 805 846 
30  to  34  567 715 670 757 836 820 
College 
Dropouts 
34  to  40  572 669 666 731 855 832 
  All Experience 
Levels  516 593 537 600 685 693 
0  to  4  469 573 477 569 658 645 
5  to  9  611 763 639 786 904 976 
10  to  14  728 908 798 932 1155  1230 
15  to  19  779 983 906 1024  1287  1349 
20  to  24  776  1036 964  1147 1318 1357 
25  to  29  779  1038 992  1203 1340 1365 
30  to  34  789 996 997 1213  1430  1347 





Levels  693 863 761 950 1170  1201 
 
Note: Individuals included in calculations are those between 17 and 65 years, not living in group quarters, which received 
non-zero income and worked at least one week during the previous year. Wages are in real US Dollars calculated using 
the CPI deflator with 2000 as base year. Natives are workers born within the US or who are US citizens at birth. Sources: 




   53
Table A3: 
Relative Weekly Wages Foreign-Born/ US-Born Workers by Education and Experience 
 
Group Year 
Education Experience  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2004 
0 to 4  1.172 1.147 1.304 1.463 1.756 1.442
5 to 9  0.969 1.003 0.956 0.984 1.082 1.624
10 to 14  0.969 1.030 0.942 0.904 1.062 1.031
15 to 19  0.987 1.024 0.954 0.937 0.936 0.980
20 to 24  1.009 0.996 0.959 0.991 0.947 0.874
25 to 29  1.008 0.966 0.925 0.868 1.038 0.859
30 to 34  1.055 1.046 0.892 0.933 0.935 1.027
High School 
Dropouts 
34 to 40  1.075 1.007 0.882 0.909 0.859 0.921
  All Experience 
Levels  1.030 1.027 0.977 0.999 1.077 1.095
0 to 4  0.936 1.046 1.008 1.000 1.070 1.056
5 to 9  0.948 0.977 0.918 0.988 0.961 0.970
10 to 14  0.885 0.963 0.961 1.030 1.004 0.909
15 to 19  0.984 1.011 0.962 1.037 1.057 0.938
20 to 24  1.032 0.971 0.947 1.027 0.949 0.986
25 to 29  1.063 0.965 0.962 0.982 0.988 0.905
30 to 34  1.043 1.058 0.902 0.930 0.936 0.953
High School 
Graduates 
34 to 40  1.060 1.022 0.961 0.976 0.980 1.142
  All Experience 
Levels  0.994 1.002 0.953 0.996 0.993 0.982
0 to 4  0.963 0.985 0.948 1.114 0.997 0.964
5 to 9  0.920 0.966 0.955 1.013 1.053 1.142
10 to 14  0.915 1.002 0.976 0.980 0.969 0.931
15 to 19  0.976 0.928 0.962 1.017 0.986 0.982
20 to 24  1.054 0.950 0.950 1.018 1.023 1.105
25 to 29  1.011 0.919 0.954 0.952 0.967 0.915
30 to 34  1.059 1.034 0.910 0.980 0.978 1.042
College 
Dropouts 
34 to 40  1.005 1.053 0.953 1.026 0.959 0.967
  All Experience 
Levels  0.988 0.980 0.951 1.012 0.992 1.006
0 to 4  0.959 0.984 0.995 1.011 1.163 1.141
5 to 9  0.929 0.917 0.959 0.934 1.120 1.002
10 to 14  0.927 0.909 0.977 1.006 1.017 1.020
15 to 19  0.946 0.966 1.005 1.047 0.945 0.967
20 to 24  0.980 0.991 0.956 1.014 0.946 0.905
25 to 29  0.994 0.941 0.989 1.083 1.049 0.951
30 to 34  1.021 1.011 0.933 0.996 0.973 0.965





Levels  0.966 0.966 0.964 1.013 1.016 0.982
 
Note: Individuals included in calculations are those between 17 and 65 years, not living in group quarters, which received 
non-zero income and worked at least one week during the previous year. The entries are equal to the ratio of foreign-born 
to native weekly wages. Natives are workers born within the US or who are US citizens at birth. Foreign-born are workers 
born outside the US and who are not citizens at birth. Sources: Authors’ calculations on individual data from Census 
IPUMS and ACS from Ruggles, et al (2006).  